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SPECIAL CASES IN THE LAW OF
TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
FRANCES R. HILL*
Exempt organizations depend on financial support from cor-
porate contributors.' Many corporations regard charitable contri-
butions as an element of corporate citizenship,2 and tax law
provides that corporate contributors may deduct their charitable
* Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. The author wishes to
thank Professor Elliott Manning for his helpful comments. This research was
supported by a University of Miami School of Law Summer Research Grant.
1. One source puts 1992 corporate contributions at $6 billion ANNE E. KAPLAN
(ed.), GIVING USA: THE ANuAL REPORT ON PHILArHROPY FOR THE YEAR 1992 (1993).
John Murawski, Fund Raising: Trends and Ideas-A Modest Rise in Donations,
CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY 19, 21-22 (June 1, 1995), reports that individual
contributions remain greater than corporate contributions, but notes the difficulty of
determining the level of corporate giving because of "the continued rise in the number
of companies that make donations to charity through their marketing or advertising
departments, business expenditures that are not recorded as charitable
contributions." In 1994, the American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel's Trust
for Philanthropy reported that charitable giving rose by 3.6% overall, or only .6% after
inflation. Giving by corporations fell by 2% after inflation, but the report observed
that corporations are supporting exempt organizations in ways that are not counted
as charitable contributions. See Karen W. Arenson, Charitable Giving Rose 3.6% in
1994, Philanthropy Trust Says, N.Y. TImEs, May 25,1995, at A22. The American Arts
Alliance has reported that, with respect to its 2,600 affiliated organizations, corporate
funding provides 8 percent of the total revenue of symphony orchestras and 5 percent
of the revenue of dance companies, opera companies, and museums. See American
Arts Alliances comments at the July 8, 1993 hearings on the proposed regulations on
corporate sponsorship (1993 Hearings)(available electronically at 93 TNT 147-23).
The United States Olympic Committee reported that 30 Percent of its budget comes
from corporate sponsors. Id.
2. Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, the
Nature of the Corporation, and the Social Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAuL L. REv.
1 (1994), reprinted in 11 ExEMPT ORG. TAx Rzv. 1225 (June 1995).
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contributions.3 As with individual contributions, corporate contri-
butions may be publicly acknowledged by the exempt recipient.
Acknowledgments vary from providing a list of contributors in a
concert or theater program to mounting a plaque at the entrance
to a special exhibit at a museum to putting a significant contribu-
tor's name on a university building or a hospital wing.4 These
forms of acknowledgement raise little or no contemporary
controversy. 5
Football, television, and corporate contributions proved to be
a more controversial mix. The bowl games marking the end of the
college football season are operated by tax-exempt educational
organizations.6 The bowls are financed by a combination of ticket
sales, sale of broadcast rights, sale of logo items, royalty payments
from licensing the bowl name and logo, concessions sales, licens-
ing of game program sales, and contributions, largely from corpo-
3. I.R.C. § 170. All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (the "Code" or the "I.R.C.").
4. Rev. Rul. 67-342, 1967-2 C.B. 187 (public broadcasting sponsor
acknowledgements that do not mention the sponsor's products or services); Rev. Rul.
77-367, 1977-2 C.B. 192 (contributor's name on a facility). For a more complete
discussion of permissible acknowledgements by an exempt organization, see infra at
text accompanying notes 82-92.
5. There has been controversy over the request made by the Philip Morris
Tobacco Company that the beneficiaries of its charitable largesse support its efforts to
defeat or restrict a proposed ban on smoking in public places in New York City.
Jonathan P. Hicks, Tobacco Industry Fights New York Over Smoking Bill, N.Y. TnMEs,
Sept. 26, 1994, at Al (varying reactions by charities to requests for lobbying support);
Jonathan P. Hicks, Foes of Ban on Smoking Win Changes, N.Y. TIMs, Oct. 13, 1994,
at B1 (one city council member reports "a lot of pressure on Council members from
cultural groups"). A New York Times editorial on October 9, 1994, stated:
Philip Morris has, to its considerable credit, been a lavish and
unintrusive supporter of America's cultural institutions for nearly 40
years. Last week, however, it demanded a quid pro quo by asking city art
groups it had aided to put in a good word for it with Peter Vallone
[sponsor of smoking ban proposal in city council]. Many did, saying that
while they were taking no position on the bill they wanted to go on record
about Philip Morris's generosity to the city-and, however reluctantly,
adding their weight to the tobacco company's.
6. Bowl committees are treated as I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) educational organizations.
Tecl Adv. Mem. 78-51-004 (Aug. 21, 1978)(bowl committee affiliated with an
intercollegiate athletic conference). Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,775 (Jan. 24, 1989)(bowl
committee satisfies requirements of an amateur athletic organization under I.R.C.
§ 501(j) and thereby qualifies as an I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organization). Richard L.
Kaplan, Intercollegiate Athletic Organizations and the Unrelated Business Income
Tax, 80 COLuM. L. REv. 1430 (1980). For an argument that such organizations are
properly taxable, see Amy Forsythe, Implications of the Cotton Bowl Ruling on the
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rate contributors.7 Controversy arose when the bowls began to
acknowledge the contribution of the primary corporate contribu-
tor, sometimes referred to as the corporate title sponsor, by paint-
ing the corporate name, and often the corporate logo, on the
playing field and affixing patches bearing the corporate name or
logo or both to the players' uniforms. Most bowl games, with the
notable exception of the Rose Bowl, now include the corporate
sponsor's name in the official name of the bowl.8 The Internal
Revenue Service (the "Service") took the position that corporate
sponsorship payments were unrelated income to the bowl commit-
tees, thereby subjecting them to tax on the income and potentially
jeopardizing their continued exempt status.9
The corporate sponsorship controversy involves significant
amounts of money and the tax treatment of these amounts
involves potentially significant amounts of tax revenue. The Con-
gressional Research Service estimated that exempt organizations
received $1.1 billion in corporate sponsorship payments, of which
$64 million was paid to college football bowl organizations and the
remainder to other sports, arts, music, community and cause-
related events. 10 The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated
that bills that would not tax corporate sponsorship payments to
7. See Tech- Adv. Mem. 92-31-001 (Oct. 22, 1991) (John Hancock Sun Bowl
ruling) for a discussion of various sources of revenue received by the exempt bowl
committee. Tax treatment of these contributions by the bowl committee is the focus of
the corporate sponsorship controversy.
8. During the 1994-95 holiday season, the bowls were named the Jeep-Eagle
Aloha Bowl, the CompUSA Florida Citrus Bowl, the USF&G Sugar Bowl, the Poulan
Weed Eater Independence Bowl, the Outback Steakhouse Gator Bowl, the Raycom
Freedom Bowl, the Weiser Lock Copper Bowl, the Thrifty Car Rental Holiday Bowl,
the Jimmy Dean St. Jude Liberty Bowl, the Builders Square Alamo Bowl, the FedEx
Orange Bowl, the IBM OS2 Fiesta Bowl, the Mobil Cotton Bowl, and the Carquest
Bowl. Bowls that did not display a corporate name or logo on the field during the
1994-95 bowl season were the Rose Bowl, the Heritage Bowl, the Sun Bowl, the Peach
Bowl, and the Hall of Fame Bowl Mobil has announced that it will no longer sponsor
the Mobil Cotton Bowl. See WASH. Posr, Apr. 3, 1995 at C.7. See also Richard Alm,
Corporate Carousel; Turnover of Sponsors for Sports Events on the Increase, Dallas
Morning News (May 19, 1995) at B.1. This decision by Mobil Corporation follows
from the dissolution of the Southwest Conference, which supplied the host team of the
Cotton Bowl. Although based in Virginia, the Mobil Corporation had a close
relationship with the schools of the Southwest Conference because of their excellence
in sciences and engineering required in petroleum production. Mobil Corporation
made a parting gift of $1 million to the Cotton Bowl Athletic Association.
9. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 (Aug. 16, 1991) (Mobil Cotton Bowl ruling)
and Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-31-001 (Oct. 22, 1991)(John Hancock Sun Bowl).
10. Congressional Research Service, Corporate Title Sponsorship Payments to
Nonprofit College Football Bowl Games: Should They Be Taxed 3 (CRS 92-157 E)(Feb.
11, 1992). Some reports put total corporate sponsorship payments at over $3 billion
per year. M.J. McCarthy, Keeping Careful Score of Sports Tie-Ins, WALL ST. J., Apr.
1995-1996]
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bowl committees would lose $33 million in tax revenue over five
years.
11
This issue is also important to the schools of the participating
teams, which receive 75 percent of the bowl revenue. 12 The pres-
ence or absence of a corporate sponsor can affect the revenue
received by the participating schools. For example, the Sun Bowl
has announced that it is considering reducing the payments to the
participating teams from $1 million to $750,000 because of the
loss of its corporate sponsor, John Hancock Financial Services,
after the 1993 game.'
3
The corporate sponsorship issue does not involve any question
of improper deductions by the corporate contributor. If the con-
tributor is treated as having purchased advertising, the amount is
currently deductible as an ordinary or necessary trade or business
expense. 14 If the amount is treated as a charitable contribution, it
is also currently deductible.15
Similarly, corporate sponsorship does not raise questions of
misconduct by the recipient organization. The issues raised by
corporate sponsorship are technical income taxation issues relat-
ing to whether the corporate sponsorship payment is taxable to
24, 1991 (corporate sponsorship payments of approximately $3 billion made by some
4,200 corporate sponsors).
11. Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects of Conference
Agreement to H.R. 11 (JCX-38-92)(Oct. 6, 1992). Because Congress at that time
required that every revenue-losing provision be offset by a specifically identified
revenue-raising provision, the supporters of the corporate sponsorship provision
proposed to tax income received by exempt organizations from affinity credit cards,
but this was estimated by the Joint Committee to produce only $11 million in revenue
over the same five years. An earlier revenue estimate in House of Representatives
Rep. 102-700, Treatment of Certain Sponsorship Payments, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(July 1992) projected an $8 million revenue shortfall, with $21 million in revenue
foregone under the corporate sponsorship provision and $13 million in revenue raised
from taxing exempt organization's income from affinity credit cards. These shifting
numbers illustrate the "illusion of precision" discussed by Michael J. Graetz, Paint-
by-Numbers Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. Rxv. 609, 613 (1995).
12. During the 1991-92 bowl season some 100 schools received more than $64
million from bowls according to Rep. Ed Jenkins (D-Ga.). See 138 Cong. Rec. H6636-
37 (July 27, 1992). Rep. Jenkins sponsored legislation to exempt corporate
sponsorship payments from taxation. See infra at text accompanying notes 301-14.
13. Sun Bowl Strapped, Wash. Post, July 28, 1995, at F5.
14. I.R.C. § 162(a). Efforts in the past to require advertising costs to be
capitalized on grounds that advertising created an intangible asset that extended
over more than one taxable year have never prevailed and I.R.C. § 197 makes no
reference to intangibles created by advertising.
15. I.R.C. § 170(b)(2) limits a corporation's annual charitable contribution
deduction to 10 percent of its taxable income as adjusted, but I.R.C. § 170(d)(2XA)
provides for a five-year carryover period for deduction of charitable contributions in
excess of the annual limit.
[Vol. 13:5
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the recipient organization as income from the sale of advertising
and whether, in particular cases, the size of the corporate sponsor-
ship payment as a share of the organization's total receipts might
jeopardize its continued exempt status.
16
This article analyzes these issues through a transactional
model of exempt organization operations. This model identifies
three core transactions that together provide a model of exempt
organization operations. These three core transaction are the
charitable contribution transaction, the exempt function transac-
tion, and the unrelated business income transaction. The article
then analyzes corporate sponsorship transactions in terms of this
model and in light of the law applicable to these three transac-
tions. Having concluded that corporate sponsorship fits most
closely the unrelated business income transaction, the article
examines the efforts made by the Service to find a basis in law for
not including corporate sponsorship payments in unrelated busi-
ness income and the legislative and administrative lobbying
efforts mounted by certain exempt organizations and several lead-
ing practitioners not only to protect corporate sponsorship pay-
ments from inclusion in unrelated business income but also to lay
the foundation for even more fundamental changes in the unre-
lated business income tax. Yet, what appeared to have been a
stunning victory has become policy paralysis, largely due to the
subsequent enactment of new statutory provisions that did not
deal directly with corporate sponsorship. The article explores the
concept of statutory dissonance and its implications for efforts to
sustain the Service's current position on corporate sponsorship.
The article suggests that the Service cannot maintain this posi-
tion without undermining the existing statutory structure of the
unrelated business income tax. The article concludes that exclud-
ing corporate sponsorship payment from unrelated business
income through a narrowly-focused legislative provision would
more effectively avoid these broader consequences of statutory dis-
sonance than would reaching the same result through a regula-
tory exclusion.
16. The larger tax issues are whether corporate sponsorship involves subsidies
in the form of the charitable contribution deduction and the organization's exemption
and the distributional consequences of any subsidies. A subsidy analysis is beyond
the scope of this article. There has been relatively little attention to the exemption as
a subsidy. Slightly more attention has been devoted to the charitable contribution
deduction in the context of general considerations of the problems involved in defining
income for federal income tax purposes. See, e.g., Boris . Bittker, Charitable
Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants? 28 TAx L. RE". 37 (1972).
1995-1996]
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I. A TRANSACTIONAL MODEL OF ExEMPT ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
Contemporary exempt organizations engage in a broad range
of activities beyond simply accepting contributions which they
transfer to the needy. While exempt organizations vary in the
scope and complexity of their operations, few exempt organiza-
tions fit the operational stereotype of charities of a bygone era.
17
Corporate sponsorship arrangements typify these contemporary
realities.
The controversy over corporate sponsorship has become so
intense in part because there is no theory of exempt organization
operations that provides guidance in understanding the transac-
tion by putting the corporate sponsorship transaction in a larger
context of exempt organization operations. Theories of exempt
organizations have focused on the purpose of the exemption, not
on the operation of organizations that have been granted exempt
status.'- While this question is important, focus on purpose apart
from operation obscures understanding of the broad range of
transactions that characterize exempt organizations operations
and which may or may not be consistent with achieving an organi-
zation's exempt purposes. Purpose-based theories focus on
delineating the boundaries of exempt organizations in terms of
those distinctive goals that are thought to be consistent with
exempt status. A transactional theory ultimately finds the basis
for exempt status in the operation of the organizations by looking
not only at how an organization uses its revenue but also at how it
derives its funding and what activities it undertakes. Analysis of
such transactions directs attention to exempt organizations' inter-
actions with a broad range of exempt and non-exempt entities as
well as with individuals, and such interactions shape exempt
17. FRANCES R. HnL and BARBARA L. KIRSCHTEN, FEDERAL AND STATE TAXATION
OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 1 1.01 (1994) (hereinafter, "Hill and Kirschten") discusses
the "new entrepreneurialism" of exempt organizations.
18. See generally, Robert Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C.
L. Rxv. 501 (1990); Boris I. Bittker and George K Rahdert, The Exemption of
Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299
(1967)(exemption as a means of dealing with problems of defining income of exempt
organizations); John D. Columbo, Why Is Harvard Tax-Exempt? And Other Mysteries
of Tax Exemption for Private Educational Institutions, 35 ARIz. L. REV. 841 (1993);
Mark A. Hall and John D. Columbo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax
Exemption, 52 Omo STATE L.J. 1379 (1991); Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of
Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980); Henry B. Hansmann, The Rationale for
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organizations.' 9 A transactional theory of the reasons for exemp-
tion would derive from interactions among the organization, its
sources of income, and the beneficiaries of its activities and would
treat exempt organizations as complex systems that engage simul-
taneously and. appropriately in several types of transactions.
Developing a fully-specified transactional theory of exemption is
beyond the scope of the present article.
For purposes of understanding corporate sponsorship in the
context of current law, the article develops a transactional model
of the three core transactions of exempt organizations-the chari-
table contributions transaction, the exempt fimction transaction,
and the unrelated business transaction. Each of these transac-
tions is defined in terms of the interactions of a transferor, the
recipient organization, and beneficiaries of the organization's use
of the transferred amounts.
A charitable contribution transaction involves a transfer by
the contributor with the intent to support the organization's
exempt activities and without the expectation of any return. The
organization accepts the contribution for use in the fulfillment of
its exempt purposes.20 The gratification that a contributor may
feel from having used his or her resources for a purpose he or she
finds important is not the type of benefit that creates a taxable
intangible benefit that can be valued. The organization provides
the contributor primarily this satisfaction, perhaps with a public
acknowledgement of the contribution. In general, the exempt
19. For examples of theories that see interaction as fundamental to the
understanding of social organizations, see, MARCEL MAuSS, THE GIFT: FORMs AND
FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SocITIES (Norton ed. 1955); GEORGE SIMMEL,
CoNFLICT AND THE WEB OF GROUP AFFILIATIONS (R. Bendix trans. 1955) and THE
SOCIOLOGY OF GEORGE SnUMEL (K. Wolff ed. 1950). Clifford Geertz studies meaning in
terms of socio-cultural interactions between aspects of selves and the panoply of socio-
cultural structures that such "selves" encounter and then looks to the selves so
created to understand organizations, cultures, societies. See, e.g., CLIFFORD GEERTZ,
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983), which
contains Geertz 1981 Storrs Lectures at the Yale Law School, entitled "Local
Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective."
20. In practice, any effort to trace the use of contributions encounters the
fungibility of money. One of the critiques of the unrelated business income tax is that
exempt organizations can use deductible contributions as venture capital in taxable
enterprises. The limitation on the scope of unrelated business activities represents
an effort to address this problem by revoking an organization's exempt status.
Another example is the use of deductible contributions to fund political activities. A
third example is the use of deductible contributions to fund lobbying activities. The
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ("OBRA '93") addressed this problem by
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organization retains discretion in how to use the amount contrib-
uted in pursuit of its exempt purposes but it does not exercise any
discretion to determine whether a charitable contribution will be
used for such purposes.21  The charitable contribution thus
involves no element of an exchange and instead involves coopera-
tion between the contributor and the recipient organization to ful-
fill the exempt organization's exempt purpose.22 The beneficiaries
are third parties who receive services from the exempt organiza-
tion in the broad sense. The contributor is not in the class of chari-
table beneficiaries.
The exempt function transaction involves the payment of a
fee for a product or service that the organization has been granted
exemption to provide.2" The payor in this transaction makes the
payment with the specific intent of receiving a particular return
benefit. The exempt organization does not have any discretion as
to whether it will provide the agreed-upon goods or services. The
organization's obligation is very specific in this transaction. It has
agreed to provide a specific service at an agreed upon price to a
specific beneficiary. The organization does not acknowledge this
type of payment. The service provided by the organization is the
type of service that supports the organization's exempt purpose.
The direct exchange between the organization and the payor is
consistent with the organization's exempt purpose. The payor is
not making a contribution to an organization for that organiza-
tion's use in providing benefits to third parties. Instead, the payor
has made a payment for a specific benefit to himself or herself.
The unique feature here is that the payor is also a member of the
class of beneficiaries that the organization has been granted
exemption to serve. Payment of tuition by students at an exempt
educational institution illustrates an exempt function transaction.
21. See the discussion of I.R.C. § 170 infra at Part HI (A). A charitable
contribution will be deductible under this section only if it is both made to a qualifying
organization and made for a qualifying purpose. Thus, the structure of I.R.C. § 170
underscores the recipient organization's lack of ultimate discretion over whether to
use the contribution for a qualifying purpose.
22. In fact, of course, exchanges involve elements of cooperation. For purposes of
specifying a model, however, attention focuses on the relative significance of a factor
rather than on its empirical incidence.
23. Reference to an exempt function transaction or exempt function income here
is distinguished from the meaning given to exempt function income under LR.C.
§ 512(aX3)(B) with respect to a special rule applicable to social clubs, voluntary
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The unrelated business transaction involves a payment for
goods or services, the provision of which is not substantially
related to the organization's exempt purpose. The payor has bar-
gained for a specific item in exchange for the payment. The organ-
ization has no discretion in providing the goods or services
purchased because, it, too, has agreed to a specific exchange.
There is no third party beneficiary in this transaction. The payor
and the organization have agreed to an exchange that benefits
them directly, but neither has any intention of benefitting one or
more third parties. The payor here does not have the dual charac-
ter as a payor for a specific benefit and a member of a charitable
class with respect to the organization. The payor stands solely in
a relationship of a purchaser with respect to the exempt
organization.
The features of these three core transactions can be put into
sharper relief by a series of pairwise comparisons among them.
The starkest contrast is between a charitable contribution trans-
action and an unrelated trade or business transaction. The chari-
table contribution transaction is a three-party transaction that
both the contributor and the organization intend will directly ben-
efit the charitable class that the exempt organization was estab-
lished to benefit. Both the contribution and the use of the
contribution are directed to the exempt purpose of the organiza-
tion. The unrelated business transaction is directed solely to the
interests of the two parties, neither of which is acting with refer-
ence to the purpose that is the basis of the organization's exempt
status. The unrelated business income transaction is indistin-
guishable from a commercial, two-party transaction between a
purchaser and a taxable seller.
The distinction between the charitable contribution and the
exempt function transaction is less stark. While the organization
operates to fulfill its exempt purpose in providing the goods or
services in question, the payor is not making a contribution but is
instead making a payment for the personal receipt of such goods
or services. In this sense, the transaction involves no charitable
beneficiary and is, like the unrelated business income transaction,
indistinguishable from the ordinary commercial transaction. In
another sense, however, the exempt function transaction involves
a benefit of a type consistent with the organization's exempt pur-
pose and thereby makes the fee-paying recipient a member of the
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The comparison of the exempt function transaction and the
unrelated business transaction also highlights elements of com-
monality. The exempt function transaction as a hybrid transac-
tion shares with the unrelated business transaction the element of
a direct exchange of a payment to the organization in exchange for
a benefit provided directly to the payor. The difference arises from
the organization's not acting in fulfillment of its exempt purpose
in the unrelated business transaction. The commonality is the
payor's bargain for a direct benefit through a direct quid pro quo
exchange. The benefit is not consistent with the organization's
exempt purpose in the unrelated business transaction, while it is
consistent with the organization's exempt purpose in the exempt
function transaction.
These three core transactions provide a framework for analyz-
ing corporate sponsorship transactions in the context of the law of
exempt organizations.
II. CORPORATE SPONSORSHIP TRANSACTIONS
While actual corporate sponsorship arrangements vary, it is
useful to begin by identifying common significant elements
presented by the agreements relating to sponsorship of the college
football bowl games.' The reason for focusing on these agree-
ments is that they have been the center of the current controversy
and the current proposed regulations have been drafted with them
as the model. These core elements of corporation sponsorship
transactions can then be analyzed both in terms of the three
transactions that define the model of exempt organization activity
and in terms of the law applicable to charitable contributions and
unrelated business income. As the following analysis reveals, the
common corporate sponsorship transaction shares more elements
with the unrelated business income transaction than with either
the charitable contribution transaction or with the exempt func-
tion transaction. In addition, the corporate sponsorship transac-
tion does not satisfy the requirements for a deductible charitable
contribution but instead satisfies the elements of the statutory
definition of unrelated business income.
Corporate sponsorship payments are made pursuant to
detailed contracts between the exempt recipient and the corporate
payor. The corporate payor agrees to pay the exempt recipient the
amount provided in the contract. The amount of the payment may
24. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 (Dec. 2, 1991) (Mobil Cotton Bowl ruling); Tech.
Adv. Mem. 92-31-001 (Oct. 22, 1991)(John Hancock Sun Bowl ruling).
[Vol. 13:5
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be fixed or contingent, paid in a lump sum or over time. The
exempt recipient agrees to present the event, whether concert or
performance or game identified in the agreement and to recognize
in the manner provided in the contract the support provided by
the contributor.
The more controversial aspects of these corporate sponsorship
agreements are the obligations of the recipient exempt organiza-
tions. In the case of the bowl games, the bowl committee may
agree to change its name to include that of the corporate sponsor
and to redesign its logo (or permit the corporate sponsor to rede-
sign the bowl game logo) to incorporate the corporate sponsor's
logo. The corporate sponsor's name or logo or both are promi-
nently displayed on the playing field and generally on the players
as well. In addition, the bowl committee agrees to ensure that tel-
evision coverage of the game displays the portion of the field show-
ing the logo for a specified amount of time. For example, in one
bowl game, television viewers saw the corporate sponsor's name
and logo approximately sixty times and heard the sponsor's name
approximately fifty times.25 Broadcast graphics may also display
the corporate name or logo as incorporated in the bowl name and
logo, and some agreements give the corporate sponsor a veto over
the broadcast organization providing the television and radio cov-
erage.26 In addition, the corporate sponsor may agree to purchase
a stated amount of advertising time during the game broadcast. 7
The bowl committee may offer tickets to executives of the corpo-
rate sponsor and may arrange special social events for the spon-
sor's employees and guests. At least one bowl in the 1994-95 bowl
season featured an appearance by the corporate sponsor's chief
executive riding in a convertible during the half-time show in a
parade that also featured a convertible-borne bowl queen and her
court. 28 The chief executive (but not the bowl queen) was inter-
viewed by the on-field sports analyst. The sponsor's products may
be available exclusively at the event. A corporate sponsor may be
the exclusive sponsor or displays of other corporate supports may
be displayed less prominently, for example, on the scoreboard or
along the sidelines rather than on the field.
25. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-31-001 (Oct. 22, 1991) (referring to names and logos on
football fields as "well-positioned visual images").
26. Id.
27. Id., citing Randall Rothenberg, More Caution by Sponsors After Shoal Creek
Furor, N. Y. Tics, Aug. 10, 1990, at A17 (to the effect that a corporate sponsor will
commonly buy one quarter to one third of the advertising time).
28. The IBM OS2 Fiesta Bowl of January 2, 1995.
1995-19961
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Corporate sponsors may acquire broad influence over the
event itself. The recent decision to move the FedEx Orange Bowl
from the Orange Bowl to Joe Robbie Stadium beginning with the
New Year's Day 1997 game is a case in point.2" FedEx, the title
sponsor, paid $26 million for title sponsorship over six years. This
substantial corporate sponsorship payment is second only to the
$82 million paid by CBS for the right to broadcast the game for six
years. The Orange Bowl is one of the three games in a new
national championship system that will feature the number one
and number two ranked teams in one of the three games each year
on a rotating basis.3 0 To win a spot in this rotation, the Orange
Bowl had to agree to move to the newer stadium in the suburbs.
31
The FedEx manager of sports and event marketing, Nancy
Alternburg, stated that if the Orange Bowl had not won a spot in
the new national championship rotation, "it would have affected
our deal-there's no doubt."
3 2
These features associated with corporate sponsorship of col-
lege football bowl games are found in other sponsorship arrange-
ments as well. For example, a local soft drink bottling company
agreed to sponsor an arts and crafts fair in return for the exclusive
right to display a banner at the event and to sell its brand of soft
drink and allied products exclusively at the concession stands.
33
Several universities have entered arrangements with soft drink
companies to give that company the exclusive right to sell their
product on campus in exchange for a sizable payment.3 4 Georgia
29. Orange Bowl Stadium Sees Glory Slipping Away, N. Y. TMEs, Jan. 1, 1995,
at A36.
30. Id. This new system is being run by the newly-created Bowl Alliance, which
will reportedly receive approximately $100 million over six years from corporate
sponsors and broadcast rights.
31. According to The New York Times (January 1, 1995): "Mr. Williamson, the
Orange Bowl Committee's president, said the college representatives had made it
clear that if the game was not moved to a modern stadium, 'we'd be out of the
running.'" Four cities were competing for the three spots in the national
championship bowl rotation.
32. Id., which also quotes the CBS vice president for sports programming as
saying that the payment for broadcast rights had also depended on the Orange Bowl's
selection for the Bowl Alliance's national championship rotation.
33. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-17-001 (Sept. 30, 1991). The Service ruled that the
payment was not unrelated business income to the recipient organization because the
fair was a qualified public entertainment activity under I.R.C. § 513(d)(2)(C). See
infra at text accompanying notes 222-23.
34. For a discussion of these developments, see Paul Streckfus, Georgia Tech
Takes Corporate Sponsorship to a New Level, 66 TAX NoTEs 1061 (February 13, 1995).
See also, Roger Thurow, Shoe Companies, Tongues Out, Buy Up College Teams
Wholesale, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1995 at B9.
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Tech has agreed to paint the Golden Arches of McDonalds at the
center of its basketball court, to include "McDonalds" in the name
of its entire athletic complex, and to give McDonalds an exclusive
franchise on campus. 35 A more innovative approach was taken by
Chrysler, which made a payment to a museum in exchange for the
right to park one of its current vehicles in the museum.3 6 A
Chrysler spokesman is quoted as saying that "What we want is
our cars exposed to the right type of people."37
The specificity of the obligations of the bowl committee gives
at least the initial appearance of an exchange. The ultimate ques-
tion is whether the corporate sponsor would have given the same
amount of money or any money at all in the absence of some or all
of these conditions. Statements from some corporate sponsors
support the exchange characterization of the corporate sponsor-
ship transaction.38  For example, an executive of John Hancock
Financial Services estimated that the company received advertis-
ing worth $5.2 million from its $1.1 million payment to the Sun
Bowl Committee.39 Similarly, a Harvard Business School study,
which appears to have been based on the agreement between John
Hancock Financial Services and the Sun Bowl concluded that the
company received a significant benefit.' Fundraisers also empha-
size the importance of providing some return benefit to potential
corporate contributors. A hospital development director esti-
mated that only 10 percent of corporate contributors expect no
quid pro quo and that 10 percent do not give at all.4 1 Of the
remaining 80 percent, this development director remarked:
35. Id. McDonald's famous logo will also appear on all tickets and game
programs and McDonald's will have the exclusive right to operate concessions at the
university's coliseum.
36. WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 1993 at B12.
37. Id., which indicates that "the yuppie demographic" constituted "the right
type of people' for this purpose.
38. See Nathan Wirschafter, Fourth Quarter Choke: How the IRS Blew the
Corporate Sponsorship Game, 27 Loy. LA L. REv. 1465 (1994), reprinted in 64 TAx
NoTEs 1455 (Sept. 12, 1994).
39. Congressional Research Service, supra note 10, at 7.
40. This case study was widely read within the Service, and its impact on the
Service's initial position that the corporate sponsorship payment was taxable to the
organization as unrelated business income from the sale of advertising has been
described as "pivotal." See remarks of Beth Purcell, Office of Chief Counsel (EP/EO)
to the American Bar Association Exempt Organizations Committee, reprinted in 6
ExEwTr ORG. TAx REv. 388, 391-92 (Aug. 1992).
41. Comment by John Hyde of the Dallas Methodist Hospitals Foundation on
the Service's proposed audit guidelines (available electronically at 92 TNT 110-68Xall
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Their employees and directors regularly remind one another
of their fiduciary responsibilities to the corporation and its own-
ers. Volunteers and employees of non-profit organizations must
persuade the corporation's employees and directors that support-
ing their organizations is in the corporation's best interest. Their
strongest means of persuasion exist in providing positive exposure
for the corporation. Generally speaking, marketing, advertising,
and public affairs departments have the largest budgets for corpo-
rate sponsorships and contributions. When a marketing staff per-
son receives little justification (little or no promotion or exposure)
the answer to a charitable request is no. More active enforcement
of more restrictive guidelines will not cause such corporations to
be more altruistic and philanthropic in their giving. These corpo-
rations will only channel their sponsorship dollars into non-chari-
table corporate promotional programs. 42 In the same vein, the
Coconut Grove Arts Festival commented that
The proposed guidelines reflect a remarkable naivete about
the relationship between corporate donors and tax exempt
events. For profit corporations do not part with their earn-
ings easily. Although most tax exempt events do not provide
their sponsors with benefits the value of which can be mea-
sured dollar for dollar to be commensurate with the amount
of the contribution, corporate sponsors expect to obtain some
real value for their contributions. Indeed, the sort of com-
pletely disinterested corporate generosity apparently
assumed by the proposed guidelines rarely, if ever, exists.43
The festival organizers told the Service that they acknowledge
their corporate sponsor's contributions in several ways, depending
on the amount of the contribution.44 For example, a corporate
sponsor might receive one or more booths at which to display prod-
ucts, it might be given an exclusive right to display a particular
type of product, a corporate sponsor's name and logo might appear
in festival advertising, including print advertisements, radio or
television advertisements, and street banners, special parking
permits and invitations to special social events during the festival,
or a full-page advertisement in the festival souvenir program.45
The Toledo Zoo also stated that, although corporate sponsorship of
events accounted for less than 1 percent of their gross revenue in
42. Id,
43. Comment of the Coconut Grove Arts Festival on the proposed audit
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1991, "[w]e do offer exposure of a sponsor's name and logo and
have, in some instances, linked the amount of payment to the
amount of the exposure."46 The Miami Festival Association told
the Service that "corporations must be able to justify their invest-
ment in non-direct business related activities in terms of
obtaining some real value for their contributions."4" The Ameri-
can Association of Museums stated that it provides special events
for the employees of institutional supporters as a way of "bringing
the sponsor into additional contact with the museum."
4
These statements are, of course, not definitive, and the state-
ments of one corporate sponsor do not address the intent of any
other corporate sponsor. Nevertheless, they raise at least a
threshold question of whether the corporate sponsorship transac-
tion involves the kind of quid pro quo characteristic of an unre-
lated business transaction but not of a charitable contribution
transaction or an exempt function transaction.49 The next three
sections of the article address this question by analyzing corporate
sponsorship in terms of the tax law requirements applicable to
each of the three core transactions of the transactional model of
exempt organization operations.
III. CHARITABLE CONTRBUTION TRANSACTIONS
In order to treat the corporate sponsorship transaction as a
charitable contribution transaction, the corporate sponsor must
act with the intent to benefit the organization's charitable class
and the organization must provide benefits to the charitable class
46. Comment by the Toledo Zoo on the proposed audit guidelines (available
electronically at 92 TNT 110-76).
47. Comment of the Miami Festivals Association on the proposed audit
guidelines (available electronically at 92 TNT 140-50).
48. Comment of the American Association of Museums on proposed audit
guidelines (available electronically at 92 TNT 163-74). The comment suggested that
these perquisites should be distinguished from the "luxuries and perquisites which
are far removed from the tax-exempt purpose of the donee institution" like chauffeur-
driven limousines and hospitality suites at bowl games but did not offer a rationale
for the distinction-
49. For a study of diverse social structures in terms of the nature of the nature of
exchange transactions characteristics of the various types, see MARCEL MAUSS, THE
Giam: FoRMs AND FUNCnONS oF EXCHANGE N ARcHmc Socim~s. Mauss writes of his
approach:
We intend in this book to isolate one important set of phenomena:
namely, prestations which are in theory voluntary, disinterested and
spontaneous, but are in fact obligatory and interested. The form usually
taken is that of a gift generously offered; but the accompanying behavior
is formal pretence and social deception, while the transaction itself is
based on obligations and economic self-interest.
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and not to the corporate sponsor. There can be no quid pro quo
benefit to the contributor. Thus, the recipient organization may
acknowledge the contribution but may not provide the contributor
anything of value.5 °
A. Contributions and Gifts
Section 170(a) provides that a "charitable contribution" is
deductible for the taxable year in which it is made.51 Section
170(c) defines a charitable contribution as "a contribution or gift"
to an eligible recipient organization.52 The legislative history does
not indicate why the statute refers to both contributions and gifts,
but courts have looked to the leading cases on gift treatment in
determining whether a particular transfer qualifies as a charita-
ble contribution.53
The Supreme Court has defined a gift for purposes of section
102 as a transfer motivated by "detached and disinterested gener-
osity."54 In this case, Duberstein received a new Cadillac from an
acquaintance to whom Duberstein had referred potential custom-
ers.55 The Court held that Duberstein must include the value of
the Cadillac in his gross income because it was not an excludable
gift and no other exclusion applied. The Court held that "the mere
absence of a legal or moral obligation to make such a payment
does not establish that it is a gift."5 6 Instead, the Court looked to
the transferor's intent as determined by "an objective inquiry."s 7
The Court rejected any test based on presumptions about human
behavior and held instead that decisions "must be based ulti-
mately on the application of the fact-finding tribunal's experience
with the mainsprings of human conduct to the totality of the facts
50. See infra at text accompanying notes 82-92 for a discussion of the
acknowledgement of charitable contributions.
51. I.R.C. § 170(b) provides certain limitations on deductions by both individuals
and corporations, but I.R.C. § 170(d) provides that excess charitable contributions
may be carried forward for five succeeding taxable years.
52. I.R.C. § 170(c)(1)-(5) lists eligible recipient organizations.
53. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 687 (1989); DeJong v.
Commissioner, 36 T.C. 896, 899 (1961), afl'd, 309 F. 2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
Commentators have also taken the position that the law applicable to gifts applies to
charitable contributions. See James W. Colliton, The Meaning of "Contribution or
Gift" for Charitable Contribution Deduction Purposes, 41 Omo ST. L.J. 973 (1980).
54. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960), (quoting
Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)(stock options from employer not gift
to employee)).
55. Id. at 281-82.
56. Id. at 285.
57. Id. at 286.
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of each case.""8 With respect to Duberstein's Cadillac, the Court
held that "despite the characterization of the transfer of the Cadil-
lac by the parties and the absence of any obligation, even of a
moral nature, to make it, it was at bottom a recompense for
Duberstein's past services, or an inducement for him to be of fur-
ther service in the future."59 The Court thus took a transactional
approach to the determination of whether an amount is properly
treated as a gift by a recipient.
Section 170 looks at a "gift or contribution" from the perspec-
tive of the deductibility by the payor, not inclusion by the recipi-
ent. However, the same transactional approach provides the
conceptual basis for section 170. The legislative history provides
that a transaction in which the payor receives something of value
does not qualify as a charitable contribution deductible by the
payor.6 0 Consistent with this legislative history, the Supreme
Court has held that "[t]he sine qua non of a charitable contribu-
tion is a transfer of money or property without adequate consider-
ation."6 1 The Court also held that a charitable contribution must
be made intentionally, stating that "[tlhe taxpayer must, there-
fore, at a minimum demonstrate that he purposely contributed
money or property in excess of the value of any benefit he received
in return."62 The failure to demonstrate such a conscious intent
formed the basis of the Court's holding that the taxpayer had not
made a charitable contribution.
The Supreme Court applied a transactional analysis in deny-
ing charitable contribution deductions for amount paid to the
Church of Scientology for "auditing" sessions with a church audi-
tor.63 The church published a price list and never offered dis-
58. Id. at 289.
59. Id. at 291-92.
60. The legislative history states that "[a] payment of money generally cannot
constitute a charitable contribution if the contributor expects a substantial benefit in
return." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 196 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. A44 (1954). The same legislative history defines a gift as a payment
"made with no expectation of a financial return commensurate with the amount of the
gift." Id. The legislative history provides an example of a payment to a hospital and
states that such payment would be deductible "only if there were no expectation of
any quid pro quo from the hospital." Id.
61. American Bar Endowment v. United States, 477 U.S. 105, 118 (1986).
62. Id.
63. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989), affg. Graham v.
Commissioner, 822 F. 2d 844 (9th Cir. 1987); Allen v. United States, 541 F. 2d 786
(9th Cir. 1976); Stubbs v. United States, 428 F. 2d 885 (9th Cir. 1970).
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counts or free auditing sessions.64 Fees from auditing sessions
were the church's main source of income.65 The Court held that
the auditing session constituted payment for a service, and that
this quid pro quo was inconsistent with deduction of the fee as a
charitable contribution.66 In so holding, the Court looked to the
transferor's intent in making the transfer as evidenced by "the
external features of the transaction in question."67 The Court set
forth its transactional analysis as follows:
As the Tax Court found, these payments were part of a quin-
tessential quid pro quo exchange: in return for their money,
petitioners received an identifiable benefit, namely, auditing
and training sessions. The Church established fixed price
schedules for auditing and training sessions in each branch
church; it calibrated particular prices to auditing or training
sessions of particular lengths and levels of sophistication; it
returned a refund if auditing and training services went
unperformed; it distributed "account cards" on which per-
sons who had paid money to the Church could monitor what
prepaid services they had not yet claimed; and it categori-
cally barred provision of auditing or training sessions for
free. Each of these practices reveals the inherently recipro-
cal nature of the exchange.6
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor took the position that the
person who paid for auditing did receive something of value but
that the value was a Constitutionally protected religious value to
which the Service had historically not applied a quid pro quo anal-
ysis. 69 The dissent thus accepted a transactional analysis as the
basic framework for determining whether a transfer qualified as a
deductible charitable contribution.
The transactional analysis of charitable contributions has
also been applied to cases in which part of the transferred amount
is exchanged for something of value and the excess amount quali-
64. Such mandatory fixed charges are based on the "doctrine of exchange," which
requires that a person give something back whenever he or she has received
something. 490 U.S. at 685.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 688.
67. Id. at 690-91.
68. Id. at 691-92.
69. Id. at 704-13. I.R.C. § 6115, which was added to the Code in 1993, excludes
from the definition of a quid pro quo contribution "any payment made to an
organization, organized exclusively for religious purposes, in return for which the
taxpayer receives solely an intangible religious benefit that generally is not sold in a
commercial transaction outside the donative context." I.R.C. §6115(b).
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fies as a deductible charitable contribution.70  This issue has
arisen most commonly in the context of fundraising events such as
performances or auctions when the payment amount exceeds the
value of the ticket or the item purchased. In this case, the Service
has long taken the position that only the excess amount is prop-
erly deductible as a charitable contribution.71
A special application of the general principles of partial gifts
occurred with respect to payments made to athletic scholarship
programs when the payment gave the payor the right to purchase
season tickets for desirable seats. The development of this chari-
table contributions issue parallels the development of the corpo-
rate sponsorship issue. The Service initially ruled that the entire
payment was nondeductible because it was a payment for a valua-
ble right, the right to purchase desirable seats at their regular
price.72 No tickets in the preferred area between the forty yard
lines were available to persons who did not make a payment to the
athletic scholarship program. There was a waiting list for the
right to make the payment and then to purchase the preferred
seats. The Service ruled that no part of the payment to the schol-
arship program was deductible as a charitable contribution
because the payor had received a substantial benefit.73
Rev. Rul. 84-132 was issued in July 1984 and was "sus-
pended" in October 1984 in the face of substantial opposition.74
The suspension was effective pending a "public session on the
implications of Rev. Rul. 84-132 upon the varied athletic scholar-
ship programs in existence throughout the country."7 5 The Ser-
70. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104; Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471; Rev.
Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104; Murphy v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 249 (1970)(fee paid to
exempt adoption agency in connection with adoption of a child not a deductible
charitable contribution).
71. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104.
72. Rev. Rul. 84-132, 1984-2 C.B. 55. This ruling did not deal with the regular
price of the ticket since this is nondeductible by the payor as an exempt function
payment, discussed infra at Part PV.
73. Id. The Service reasoned that
the taxpayer here can purchase a season ticket between the 40 yard lines
only by contributing $300 to the athletic scholarship fund. The fact that
there is a waiting list for membership in the program further indicates
that this preferred seating has significant value. In view of this, the
value of the benefit received as a result of the payment is considered to be
commensurate with the amount of the payment made, and therefore no
part of the payment constitutes a gift.
The ruling relied on Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104.
74. The suspension was first announced in New Release IR-84-111 (October 19,
1984), which was followed by Ann. 84-101, 1984-45 I.R.B. 21 (November 5, 1984).
75. Ann. 84-101, 1984-45 I.R.B. 21.
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vice also stated that "the suspension has no effect on existing
law."7 6 The Service said of the suspension:
The IRS has a longstanding position that where considera-
tion, in the form of admissions or other privileges or benefits,
is received in connection with payments by patrons of fun-
draising affairs, the presumption is that no gift has been
made for charitable contribution purposes. The burden is on
the taxpayer to establish that the amount paid is not the
purchase price of the privileges or benefits and that part of
the payment, in fact, does qualify as a gift.
77
In April 1986 the Service issued Rev. Rul. 86-63, which "clari-
fied, distinguished, and superseded" Rev. Rul. 84-132.11 The
revised ruling still rested on the substantial benefit test but more
clearly illustrated the facts and circumstances nature of the deter-
mination of the existence of a substantial benefit. In this ruling a
substantial benefit exists only when the preferred seats would not
have been readily available without making the payment to the
athletic scholarship program. However, a payment in excess of
the required payment to the athletic scholarship program would
be deductible to the extent it exceeded the amount required to
gain the right to purchase the preferred seats. If, however, seats
in the same section would have been readily available to persons
not making any payment to the athletic scholarship program, the
entire payment would be a deductible charitable contribution.
The ruling also advised the organization receiving the payment to
notify participants in the program what part, if any, of the pay-
ment might be deductible.79
Not satisfied with this result, Congress amended Section 170
by adding Section 170(1), which removed the issue from an analy-
sis based on the general principles of Section 170. Under Section
170(1) 80 percent of a payment to a college or university is deducti-
ble if "such amount would be allowable as a deduction under this
section but for the fact that the taxpayer receives (directly or indi-
rectly) as a result of paying such amount the right to purchase
tickets for seating at an athletic event in an athletic stadium of
such institution."80 Amounts paid for tickets do not qualify for
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Rev. Rul. 86-63, 1986-1 C.B. 88.
79. The Service provided guidance to organizations providing such notice in Rev.
Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471.
80. I.R.C. § 170(1)(2)(B).
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this special treatment.81 Section 170(1) provides one instance of
resolving an issue legislatively by enacting a special rule that is
inconsistent with the general principles of the statute.
B. Acknowledgement by the Recipient Organization
An acknowledgment remains the accepted and acceptable
organizational response to receipt of a deductible charitable con-
tribution. The question, of course, is what constitutes an acknowl-
edgement. Current law deals with this issue in the context of the
unrelated business income tax,82 the determination of whether an
organization is a public charity or a private foundation,83 and the
self-dealing rules applicable to private foundations." In each of
these areas the issue is whether the recipient organization has
provided to the payor something of sufficient value to constitute a
quid pro quo.
An acknowledgement is not itself valuable. The most com-
mon acknowledgement is a public statement that an individual or
corporation provided support.8 5 Variations on this public state-
ment have also been treated as acknowledgements. For example,
81. I.R.C. § 170(IX2).
82. The unrelated business income tax issue is whether the exempt organization
is acknowledging a contribution or selling advertising. See infra at Part V(A)(4) for a
discussion of advertising.
83. I.R.C. § 509 provides tests for determining whether the organization is
publicly supported, and thus, whether it qualifies as a public charity that is not
subject to the special rules applicable to private foundations. One test of public
charity status is whether at least one third of the organization's total receipts come in
the form of gifts or contributions. I.R.C. § 509(a)(2)(A)(i). Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-
3(f)(1) provides that a gift or contribution has the same meaning for purposes of this
provision as it does for purposes of I.R.C. § 170 and states that "any payment of
money or transfer of property without adequate consideration shall be considered a
'gift' or 'contribution. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-3(f)(3) provides an example of local
businesspersons who provide cash or merchandise for prizes awarded at the annual
fair to members of a young farmers' organization who win prizes. The name of the
businessperson supplying the prize is generally announced publicly when the prize is
awarded. The amounts donated will be treated as contributions because, under the
facts of this example, "[tihe recognition given to donors is merely incidental to the
making of the award to worthy youngsters." Id.
84. I.RLC. § 4941(d)(1)(E) provides that a benefit provided by a private
foundation to a disqualified persons constitutes impermissible self-dealing. Treas.
Reg. § 53.4941(d)-2(f)(2) provides that public recognition of the contributions of a
substantial contributor, who is included among disqualified persons for purposes of
the self-dealing rules, will ordinarily not constitute self-dealing because the benefit is
ordinarily incidental or tenuous. Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-2(f)(4), Example (4) states
that naming a recreation center in honor of the person who donated the land for it
does not constitute self-dealing because the benefit is incidental or tenuous.
85. For example, in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-31-029 (May 9, 1994) the Service ruled
that issuing a press release about a lunch for scholarship recipients that mentioned
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the Service has ruled that naming a building after a contributor or
including the contributor's name in the name of an event are
acknowledgements.8 6 Of course, these rulings are based on fac-
tual determinations that under the facts of the particular case,
these acknowledgements did not convey any value to the contribu-
tor. The test is not based on a search for essential attributes of an
acknowledgement but on the presence or absence of a quid pro
quo.
In one of the more controversial rulings on acknowledge-
ments, the Service took the position that naming a replica of a
historic village after the corporate sponsor and permitting the cor-
poration to refer to the village in its own advertising constituted a
mere acknowledgment.8 7 The Service reasoned that
Although the corporation benefits by having the village
named after it, by having its name associated with the vil-
lage in conjunction with its own advertising program, and by
having its name mentioned in each publication of the organi-
zation that it finances, such benefits are merely incidental to
the benefits flowing to the general public from access to the
village and its historic structures.8 8
The Service has also ruled that including the logo of a major cor-
porate supporter into the logo of an organization constitutes an
acknowledgement and not advertising even when the logo appears
prominently in a broad publicity campaign with respect to the
organization and its work.8 9
In the area of acknowledgements on public broadcast stations
the Service has looked to the Federal Communications Commis-
sion ("FCC") rules on acknowledgements on noncommercial sta-
tions.9 " The Service has found this appropriate because the FCC
requires that broadcast stations identify sponsors of particular
programs. Thus, the Service reasoned that the contributor could
not anticipate any benefit and an acknowledgment that complies
with FCC requirements will be treated as an acknowledgment for
the name of the person funding the scholarships was an acknowledgment that did not
provide a substantial return benefit.
86. Rev. Rul. 77-367, 1977-2 C.B. 192 (contributor's name on facility); News
Release IR-92-4, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 250-53.
87. Rev. Rul. 77-367, 1977-2 C.B. 193.
88. Id.
89. Priv. Ltr. RUl. 95-35-044 (June 5, 1995) (organization's logo incorporates logo
of sole corporate supporter); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-35-062 (June 5, 1992) (organization's
logo incorporates corporate supporter's logo and corporate supporter funds a broad
effort to publicize the organization and its programs).
90. See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-44-003 (July 23, 1986).
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federal income tax purposes.91 The Service has refused to extend
its reliance on FCC positions outside the public broadcast context
to contexts in which the regulatory requirement that sponsors be
identified does not apply.92
Even these somewhat controversial rulings have been based
on a transactional analysis to determine whether the recipient
organization has provided an acknowledgment or something of
value. Describing the benefits to the corporate payor as "inciden-
tal" to the benefits to the charitable class creates some ambiguity
over whether incidental means of small value or whether it means
arising from but not necessarily small in value. This ambiguity
permitted some critics of the Service's initial position on corporate
sponsorship to argue that an acknowledgement could be some-
thing of substantial value as long as it arose incidentally to pro-
viding a benefit to the charitable class. 93 This ambiguity was
resolved in 1993 when Congress amended Section 170 to require
that a recipient organization inform the transferor of the value it
has provided to the transferor. These quid pro quo rules focused
explicitly on the extent of the value provided to the payor.
C. Quid Pro Quo Contributions
In 1993, Congress amended section 170 by adding section
170(0(8), which denies a charitable contribution deduction for any
contribution of $250 or more for which the donor has not received
a contemporaneous acknowledgement from the recipient organiza-
tion stating what, if any, goods or services the donor received in
connection with the contribution. In addition, the 1993 Act added
section 6115, which requires that an organization provide the
donor of a quid pro quo contribution with a written statement
that informs the donor that the amount of the contribution that is
deductible for Federal income tax purposes is limited to the excess
of the amount of any money and the value of any property other
than money contributed by the donor over the value of the goods
or services provided by the organization94 and "provides the donor
91. Id.
92. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-34-002 (Feb. 19, 1992)(rejects FCC analogy with respect
to print advertisement in the souvenir program of an annual festival).
93. See the Comment of the ABA on the audit guidelines, discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 286-95.
94. I.R.C. § 6115(a)(1).
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with a good faith estimate of the value of such goods or services. "s s
These disclosure and valuation requirements apply only to a "quid
pro quo contribution," which is defined as "a payment made partly
as a contribution and partly in consideration for goods or services
provided to the payor by the donee organization."96 Thus, the sec-
tion 6115 disclosure and valuation requirements do not apply to
purely commercial transactions. The Service has ruled that an
organization which includes an amount in its unrelated business
income is not required to provide section 6115 disclosure to the
payor of the amount.97 In addition, an amount paid as a fee for
provision of a service that provides the basis of the organization's
exemption is not included in the quid pro quo disclosure rule.9 In
this case, although the organization does not include any amount
in its unrelated business income, the payor is not entitled to a
deduction because it received a benefit commensurate to the
amount of its payment.
The quid pro quo rules commonly apply to fundraising activi-
ties when the payor bids at an auction or purchases a ticket for an
event for an amount in excess of the value of the item or when a
contributor receives a "premium" for making a contribution. In
most if not all of these situations, the organization will not be sub-
ject to the unrelated business income tax on the amount for which
a deduction has been denied. While a transactional analysis
would point toward a different result, most of the core situations
of quid pro quo contributions trigger application of exceptions to
inclusion. For example, most charity auctions involve donated
items, for which a specific exception is provided. 9 Many fundrais-
ing events are operated by volunteers, thereby coming within the
volunteer exception.100 The existence of these exceptions helps
explain why the OBRA '93 contained no explicit provisions with
respect to the treatment of a quid pro quo contribution by the
recipient organization.
95. I.R.C. § 6115(a)(2). Under Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6115-1(a)(1) a good faith
estimate can be based on "any reasonable methodology" that an organization "applies
in good faith."
96. I.R.C. § 6115(b). This definition does not apply to "any payment made to an
organization, organized exclusively for religious purposes, in return for which the
taxpayer receives solely an intangible religious benefit that generally is not sold in a
commercial transaction outside the donative context."
97. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-21-004 (June 5, 1995).
98. Id.
99. For a discussion of the contributed property exception of I.R.C. § 513(a)(3),
see infra at text accompanying notes 213-14.
100. For a discussion of the volunteer exception of I.R.C. § 513(a)(1), see infra at
text accompanying notes 209-12.
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D. Corporate Sponsorship as Charitable Contribution
A transactional analysis strongly suggests that corporate
sponsorship transactions of the type characteristic of the college
football games are not charitable contributions by the contributor
or acknowledgements by the recipient organizations. While no
definitive determination can be made with respect to particular
cases, a policy determination can be made that the law applicable
to charitable contributions and acknowledgements does not pro-
vide any basis for determining that most corporate sponsorship
transactions can be treated as contributions by the corporation
and acknowledgements by the recipient organization. This con-
clusion is reinforced by the enactment of the quid pro quo provi-
sions in 1993. Thus, the Service's attempt to enforce the quid pro
quo provisions while treating the college bowl games as examples
of acknowledgements produces a level of statutory dissonance that
requires a reconsideration of at least one of the provisions
involved.
IV. EXEMPT FUNCTION TRANSACTIONS
To fit the model of an exempt function transaction, the corpo-
rate sponsor would have to receive a benefit of the type that is
consistent with the organization's exempt purpose. This model
transaction departs from the symmetry of the model charitable
contribution deduction by denying a Section 170 deduction but not
taxing the income to the recipient organization. 0 1
The legal basis for the exempt function transaction derives
from the unrelated business income definition that excludes
income from an activity that is substantially related to the organi-
zation's exempt purpose. In the context of the type of event to
which corporate sponsorship is generally thought to apply, exempt
function income is income from ticket sales, payments received for
attending the game or the concert or the play that the organiza-
tion has been granted exemption to present. 10 2 The Service has
101. Rev. Rul. 83-104, 1983-2 C.B. 46 (private school tuition not deductible).
102. The legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1950, Ch. 994, 64 Stat. 906,
which added the unrelated business income tax provisions to the Code stated that
"income of an educational organization from charges for admissions to football games
would not be deemed to be income from an unrelated business, since its athletic
activities are substantially related to its educational programs." H.R. REP. No. 2319,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 37, 109 (1950), 1950-2 C.B. 380, 458. For an example showing
that Congress did not intend that ticket revenue from a basketball tournament be
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applied this general statutory principle to several types of exempt
function income, including income from the sale of broadcast
rights to college athletic events.1 °3
Corporate sponsorship transactions do not involve exchanges
of a payment for provision of the type of services that provide the
basis for the recipient organization's exemption. Corporate spon-
sors have not argued that they have made substantial payments
so that they can provide event tickets to their employees or cus-
tomers or shareholders. While corporate sponsorship agreements
may provide that employees or others receive an agreed upon
number of tickets, the value represented by these tickets as a per-
centage of the total corporate sponsorship payment has been small
enough that corporate sponsors have not suggested that they be
permitted to allocate an amount of the payment to these tickets
and treat that amount as an exempt function payment that they
could not deduct and the organization would not have to include in
its unrelated business income. The corporate sponsors receive
more favorable tax treatment if they can deduct their payments as
charitable contributions or as ordinary and necessary business
expenses. The recipient organizations have also focused on defin-
ing rules that exclude the entire payment from their unrelated
business income rather than seeking to disaggregate the pay-
103. Rev. Rul. 80-296, 1980-2 C.B. 195; Rev. Rul. 80-295, 1980-2 C.B. 194; Rev.
Rul. 80-294, 1980-2 C.B. 187; and Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-51-004 (Aug. 21, 1978). In
some circumstances, corporate sponsorship payments become difficult to distinguish
from broadcast revenues. The United States Gymnastics Federation describes this
fact pattern as follows:
Instead of paying large sums for events (such as amateur gymnastics
competitions) and then selling advertising time to cover that cost,
broadcasters generally began to offer the owner of broadcast rights
dramaticallyreduced fees or no fees at all, or they required that the event
owners buy the air time in order to get the events broadcast. In most
cases the broadcaster also required that the event owner pay for the
equipment, technicians, and announcers needed to produce the
broadcast. Consistent with this shift in financial risk associated with
broadcasting amateur athletic events, broadcasters began to give event
owners the opportunity to offset these new costs by selling advertising
time during broadcasts (within Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") and other limits. Thus NGBs [national governing bodies]
increasingly have been forced to sell advertising spots during the
broadcast of events to defray either or both the cost of producing the
events for broadcast. . ., or the cost of buying air time directly from
broadcasters .... To apply UBIT [unrelated business income tax] to an
NGB's corporate sponsorship revenues simply because it receives some
payments directly from corporate sponsors, rather than through an




University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 4
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol13/iss1/4
CORPORATE SPONSORSHIP
ments according to the transactions producing the specific reve-
nue and potentially resulting in different tax treatment.
V. UNRELATED BusINESs INCOME TRANSACTION
The corporate sponsorship transaction comports most closely
with the unrelated business income transaction. Both involve a
direct two-party quid pro quo that provides no benefits to a chari-
table class and does not give the payor the kind of benefit that the
organization was granted exemption to provide.
The statutory structure of the unrelated business income tax
reflects the quid pro quo nature of the transaction in the general
principles defining unrelated business income. At the same time,
the statute contains numerous modifications and exceptions
enacted by Congress to resolve particular cases. These modifica-
tions obscure the transactional basis of the general statutory prin-
ciples but, at the same time, preserve the structure by resolving
special cases without modifying the generally applicable princi-
ples.10 4 This tension between general principles and special rules
is an important element in understanding both the unrelated
business income tax provisions and the debate over corporate
sponsorship.
A. Statutory Definition of Unrelated Business Income
An unrelated trade or business is a trade or business that is
regularly carried on and that is not substantially related to the
organization's exempt purpose. 10 5 This definition is based not on
the use of the income earned from the activity, as it had been
under the destination of income test of prior law, but from the
relationship between the activity and the organization's exempt
purpose. '
0 6
104. VICTOR TuRNER, THE RrruAL PROCESS: STRuCTuRE AN ANTr-STRucTURE
(1969). ROBERT B. EDGERTON, RuLEs, EXCEPTIONS, AND SOCL ORDER (1985).
105. I.R.C. § 512(a) and I.R.C. § 513(a), and Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a) (1994).
106. For a discussion of the destination of income test of prior law, see Hill and
Kirschten supra note 17 at 10.01[l]. The 1913 Tarriff Act, 38 Stat. 171, 172 (Oct. 3,
1913) provided an exception to the corporate income tax for any corporation
"organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational
purposes, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private
stockholder or individual." The Supreme Court interpreted this provision as
exempting from income taxation the revenue used for such purposes. Trinidad v.
Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 578, 582 (1924)(religious order conducting missionary
activities in the Philippines not taxable on the income from the sale of wine and
chocolate or on income from investments in real estate and corporate securities
because such income was used in the organization's missionary work). L.C. § 502
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1. Trade or Business
A trade or business is defined for this purpose in terms of the
concept of a trade or business applicable for purposes of a business
deduction under Section 162.07 The courts have defined a trade
or business in terms of an intent to make a profit, whether or not
the organization in fact earned a profit.1 0 8 The Supreme Court
applied this test in the case of an organization that received so-
called experience dividends in exchange for serving as the policy
holder of a group insurance policy. 10 9 The Court referred to a
profit motive as "[t]he standard test for the existence of a trade or
business for purposes of §162."11 ° In so holding, the Supreme
Court reversed the Federal Circuit, which had based its opinion
on the manner in which the activities had been conducted and on
the absence of competition with commercial entities:"'
ABE's activity is both the "sale of goods" and "the perform-
ance of services," and possesses the general characteristics of
a trade or business. Certainly the assembling of a group of
better-than-average insurance risks, negotiating on their
behalf with insurance companies, and administering a group
policy are activities that can be-and are-provided by pri-
rejects the destination of income test by denying exempt status to "feeder
organizations."
107. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) provides that "for purposes of section 513 the term
'trade or business' has the same meaning it has in section 162, and generally includes
any activity carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods or
performance of services." Section 162 does not define trade or business. See F.
Ladson Boyle, What Is a Trade or Business? 39 TAx LAw 737 (1986).
108. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) provides that "where an activity carried on for the
production of income constitutes an unrelated trade or business, no part of such trade
or business shall be excluded from such classification merely because it does not
result in profit." Id.
109. United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986). The sole
issue in this case was whether the activities in question constituted a trade or
business since the parties had stipulated that the activities were regularly carried on
and not substantially related to the organization's exempt purpose.
110. Id. at 110 n. 1.
111. 761 F. 2d. 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The Federal Circuit explicitly rejected the
profit motive test, stating:
Unlike what some other courts may do, this court does not find 'profits,' or
the maximization of revenue to be the controlling basis for a
determination of whether the unrelated business tax provisions apply.
We consider not only the amount of money the charitable organization
receives, but the source and character of those funds .... A charity
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vate commercial entities in order to make a profits. ABE
itself earns considerable income from its program.
1 12
An actual profit is strong evidence of a profit motive. In
American Postal Workers, the District of Columbia Circuit pointed
to the large profits earned by enrolling "associate members" who
participated in the union's insurance program but not in any other
union activities. 1 13 The court discounted the testimony of union
officials that they had not operated the insurance program or
made it available to associate members with the intention of earn-
ing a profit.
114
Both the courts and the Service have also looked to the man-
ner in which an activity is conducted for evidence of a profit
motive and thus as evidence that an activity constitutes a trade or
business. In examining the manner in which an activity is con-
ducted, the courts have considered both the scale of the activity
and its similarity to commercial undertakings. In American Bar
Endowment, the Supreme Court held that indirect competition
with commercial enterprises was evidence of a profit motive.
1 5
112. 477 U.S. at 110-11. The court also found that "ABE has a unique asset-its
access to the ABE's members and their highly favorable mortality and morbidity
rates-and it has chosen to appropriate for itself all of the profit possible from that
asset, rather than sharing any with its members." Id. at 113.
113. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. United States, 925 F. 2d 480
(D.C. Cir. 1991), rev'g 90-1 USTC 50,013 (DDC 1989). The issue of whether
associate member dues are unrelated business income to the organization has proved
controversial as the Service has taken this position in rulings with respect to other
organizations. See Hill and Kirschten, supra note 17 at S10.02[3][b][vi].
114. Id. at 464-485. The court observed in discounting the testimony of union
officials:
In the face of overwhelming evidence of substantial net profits, the union
points to the testimony of its employees and agents that the prospect of
earning profits had never appealed-or even occurred-to anyone.
Apparently we are invited to believe that the profit received was, as has
been said of the British Empire, merely picked up in moments of
absentmindedness. Given the traditional view that parties intend the
obvious consequences of their acts, we join the other courts that have
highly discounted such self-serving testimony.
Id.
115. 477 U.S. at 114-15. The Court stated:
This case presents an example of precisely the sort of unfair competition
that Congress intended to prevent. If ABE's members may deduct part of
their premium payments as a charitable contribution, the effective cost of
ABE's insurance will be lower than the cost of competing policies that do
not offer tax benefits. Similarly, if ABE may escape taxes on its earnings,
it need not be as profitable as its commercial counterparts in order to
receive the same return on its investment. Should a commercial company
attempt to displace ABE as the group policyholder, therefore, it would be
at a decided disadvantage.
1995-1996]
29
Hill: Corporate Sponsorship in Transactional Perspective: General Princ
Published by University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository, 1996
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
The Tax Court held that a large-scale farm of 1600 acres with a
feedlot for 500 head of cattle operated with modern equipment
and according to current agricultural technology was a trade or
business even though it was operated by members of a religious
order. 116 The Service has ruled that heavily-promoted rock con-
certs held in the university's multi-purpose facility constituted
unrelated business income for the university.
1 17
The model corporate sponsorship transaction appears to sat-
isfy the test of a trade or business because the organizations in
question appear to be operating with a profit motive."18 The use of
the funds to support the organization's exempt purpose does not
defeat a finding of a profit motive. 1 9 The Cotton Bowl Committee
argued unsuccessfully that its corporate sponsorship agreement
with Mobil should not be treated as a trade or business because
the agreement involved very little additional effort by the Com-
mittee. 2 ° However, the extent of activity is only one factor that
may or may not indicate a profit motive. Whether the factual
assumption underlying the Cotton Bowl Committee's position
would apply to most other cases remains unclear. Finally, argu-
ments based on the nature of the activity involved in entering cor-
porate sponsorship agreements offer a narrow scope for a solution,
both because the activities seem to be those undertaken by taxa-
ble persons with a profit motive and because the inherent nature
Id.
116. St. Joseph's Farms of Indiana v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 9 (1985).
117. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-008 (Aug. 19, 1991). See also Gen. Coun. Mem.
39863 (Nov. 26, 1991). This ruling has been controversial because it seemed to
suggest that the Service's position was based not simply on the manner in which the
university conducted the rock concert, itself a controversial analytical approach under
the substantially related test, but also on the nature of the activity. In effect, the
ruling could be read as positing that a rock concert is "inherently commercial" while a
chamber music concert, for example, might be inherently educational. This would be
inconsistent with the substantially related test. See infra at Part V(A)(3).
118. When considering actual corporate sponsorship arrangements, this
determination requires analysis of the facts and circumstances of each case. No per se
rule applies to corporate sponsorship or any other transaction.
119. In comments on the Service's initial position on corporate sponsorship,
several bowl committees emphasized their contributions to local charities in the cities
in which the bowl game is played. See Comment of National Collegiate Athletic
Association (available electronically at 92 TNT 163-77); Comment of the Fiesta Bowl
(available electronically at 92 TNT 160-46); Comment of the Sugar Bowl (available
electronically at 92 TNT 159-50). While laudatory, such contributions have no
relevance to the issues raised by corporate sponsorship. They bespeak a nostalgia for
the destination of income test of prior law, now explicitly disallowed under the I.R.C.
§ 502 feeder organization rules. For a discussion of the destination of income test of
prior law, see Hill and Kirschten supra note 17 at 10.01[1].
120. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 (Aug. 16, 1991).
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of the activities is not determinative. Thus, the model corporate
sponsorship transaction will be treated as a trade or business
under the general rules.
The definition of a trade or business is so inclusive that
exempt organizations are rarely successful in arguing that their
income-producing activities are not a trade or business. Instead,
organizations more commonly argue that their trade or business
activities are not regularly carried on or that the activities in
question are substantially related to achievement of their exempt
purpose.
2. Regularly Carried On
A trade or business will not produce taxable unrelated busi-
ness income unless it is "regularly carried on" by the exempt
organization. 121 The conceptual rationale of this requirement is
obscure. Neither the courts nor the Service has offered any princi-
pled reason why an organization should not be taxed on income
from an unrelated trade or business that it conducts only once. If
the purpose of the unrelated business income tax is to prevent
unfair competition between exempt and taxable entities, then the
frequency of a trade or business should be conceptually irrelevant.
The frequency of such activity is arguably a factor bearing on
whether it is, in fact, a trade or business, but this interpretation
would mean that frequency would be weighed against, and thus
could be offset by, other factors within the trade or business test.
As an independent element in the definition of unrelated business
income, the requirement that a trade or business be regularly car-
ried on significantly limits the scope of the unrelated business
income tax.
The regulations provide that in determining whether an
activity is regularly carried on, "regard must be had to the fre-
quency and continuity with which the activities productive of the
income are conducted and the manner in which they are pur-
sued."122 Based on these principles, the regulations provide that a
trade or business will be regularly carried on if the activities
"manifest a frequency and continuity, and are pursued in a man-
ner, generally similar to comparable commercial activities of non-
exempt organizations."123
121. I.R.C. § 512(a)(1).
122. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(1).
123. Id., which states that these rules are to be applied in light of the general
purpose of the unrelated business income tax "to place exempt organization business
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If activities are intermittent, the regulations then place
greater relative weight on the manner in which the activities are
conducted. 124 However, activities may be so infrequent that the
manner in which they are conducted becomes irrelevant. This
rule applies to fundraising events.' 25 The regulations provide
that for purposes of this special rule "income producing or fund
raising activities lasting only a short period of time will not be
treated as regularly carried on if they recur only occasionally or
sporadically."126 Holding such an event every year will not cause
the event to be treated as regularly carried on. 127 The Service has
limited the application of this provision to activities directly con-
nected with an identifiable event.
1 28
The relevant period for measuring the duration of activities is
the subject of significant dispute between the Service and at least
one court. This dispute involves the National Collegiate Athletic
Association ("NCAA") Men's Basketball Final Four, specifically,
the sale of advertising in the Final Four program.' 29 This case
turned exclusively on whether the advertising activity was regu-
larly carried; the NCAA had conceded that the sale of advertising
is a trade or business not substantially related to its exempt pur-
pose.130 The NCAA based its case primarily on the argument that
the three-week tournament was a limited period that did not con-
activities upon the same tax basis as the nonexempt business endeavors with which
they compete." Most events that attract corporate sponsorship have no direct
commercial analogue. However, the proper focus is on the sale and solicitation of
advertising and the legally relevant comparison is between such sale and solicitation
activities with respect to the sponsored event and other intermittent events that are
taxable. The commercial analogue is not the event itself but the solicitation and sale
of advertising with respect to such an event.
124. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(ii) provides that "[i]n general, exempt
organization business activities which are engaged in only discontinuously or
periodically will not be considered regularly carried on if they are conducted without
the competitive and promotional efforts typical of commercial endeavors."
125. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2Xiii).
126. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(iii) states that "[clertain intermittent income
producing activities occur so infrequently that neither their recurrence nor the
manner of their conduct will cause them to be regarded as a trade or business
regularly carried on."
127. Treas. Reg. §1.513-1(c)(2Xiii) states that such events "will not be regarded
as regularly carried on merely because they are conducted on an annually recurrent
basis." See, Suffolk County Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.
1314 (1981) (annual vaudeville show presented by professional entertainers for the
benefit of the association was not regularly carried on).
128. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-04-001 (Sept. 29, 1992) (yearbook distributed at an
event was not directly connected with the event).
129. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, v. Commissioner, 914 F. 2d 1417 (10th
Cir. 1990), rev'g 92 T.C. 456 (1989).
130. 92 T.C. at 464-65.
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stitute regular conduct.13 1 The Tax Court held that the relevant
period was the period during which the NCAA, directly or through
its agent, solicited and sold advertising, not simply the period of
the tournament when the program containing the advertisements
was sold to the public.1 3 2 Under the Tax Court approach, adver-
tising involves two transactions, one between the advertiser and
the publisher, and the other between the publisher and the public.
The publisher is not selling advertising to the public; rather, the
publisher is making the advertising available to the public pursu-
ant to the terms of its agreement with the advertiser.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the Tax Court, holding that the
relevant period for consideration was the three-week period of the
tournament.' 33 The court treated the period during which the
NCAA solicited and sold advertising as mere "preparatory time."
Under this analysis, there was only one relevant transaction: that
between the NCAA as publisher of the program and the segments
of the public who view the program. However, the Tenth Circuit
found that "to determine the normal time span of the activity in
this case, we should consider the business of selling advertising
space, since that is the business the Commissioner contends is
generating unrelated business income."' 34 The court then com-
pared the sale of advertising in sports magazines with the NCAA's
sale of advertising for its Final Four programs, and concluded that
the NCAA's sales were intermittent and not regularly carried on.
This reasoning raises the important question of what activities
are comparable for purposes of the intermittent activity regula-
tions.' 35 It would seem that the sale of advertising in such pro-
grams as the Superbowl, the World Series, the NBA
Championship, or the Stanley Cup playoffs would be more appro-
priate comparisons than the sale of advertising in sports
magazines published throughout the year.
131. The NCAA also argued that it was only passively involved in the sale of
advertising because it contracted with a commercial agent to contact potential
advertisers. Neither court accepted this argument because the contract in question
gave the NCAA the right to control the actions of the commercial agent. See 92 T.C.
at 464-68
132. Id. at 466.
133. 914 F. 2d at 1422-1423.
134. Id. at 1422 (emphasis in original).
135. The Service has issued no guidance on comparables for this purpose. The
regulations under I.R.C. § 482 might provide some useful insights, but the Service
has not applied these principles in any ruling involving the question of appropriate
comparables in the unrelated business income context.
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The Service issued a nonacquiescence in the Tenth Circuit's
opinion, but concluded that, in the absence of a split in the cir-
cuits, it would not file a petition for certiorari. 13 6 The Service
questioned the factual basis and legal reasoning of the opinion,
focusing particularly on the court's determination that the three-
week period during which tournament games were played defined
the duration of the unrelated trade or business of selling advertis-
ing. The Service announced that it would continue to litigate this
issue. 137
The uncertainty in the standard for determining whether an
activity is regularly carried on offers one avenue for a technical
resolution of the corporate sponsorship issue. 138 Any such solu-
tion would, however, be inconsistent with the Service's current
interpretation of the Code and regulations. Attempting to recon-
cile the corporate sponsorship transactions, at least those charac-
teristic of the bowl games, with the existing rules would
undermine the rule. The result would be that very little trade or
business activity that is not substantially related to an organiza-
tion's exempt purpose would be subject to the unrelated business
income tax. In effect, the Code would be amended for all organiza-
tions and activities as a byproduct of solving a problem for a sub-
set of organizations engaging in a particular type of activity.
3. Not Substantially Related to Exempt Purpose
The final element in the definition of an unrelated trade or
business is that the activity is not substantially related to the
organization's exempt purpose. 13 9 This means that the trade or
business activity must make an important causal contribution to
the organization's performance of its exempt purpose apart from
136. NCAA v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 456, rev'd 914 F. 2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1990),
action on decision, 1991-015 (July 3, 1991).
137. See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-34-002 (Feb. 19, 1992), where the Service
stated with respect to the 10th Circuit's opinion in NCAA that it "disagrees with this
decision and will continue to litigate the issue in appropriate cases." See also, Tech.
Adv. Mem. 95-09-002, Issues 4(a) and 6(a).
138. The legislative solution enacted by Congress and pocket vetoed by
President Bush in 1992 took this approach by linking corporate sponsorship to a
"public entertainment event." See infra text accompanying notes 301-14.
139. LR.C. § 513(a). Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(1) states that a trade or business
activity that is regularly carried on will be subject to the unrelated business income
tax only if it is "not substantially related (aside from the need of such organization for
income or funds or the use it makes of the profits derived) to the exercise or
performance by such organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose or
function consisting of the basis of its exemption." Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) provides
that the relationship between the activity and the exempt purpose must be causal
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providing funding for such purpose. 140 The existence and impor-
tance of such a causal contribution is to be determined based on
all the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
14 1
The substantially related test is thus not based on the inher-
ent nature of the activity but on its relationship to performance of
the organization's exempt purpose. For example, the Service has
long taken the position that sale of pharmaceutical products by a
hospital pharmacy to the hospital's patients is substantially
related to the hospital's exempt purpose 142 but that such sales to
persons who are not patients of the hospital are not substantially
related. 143
However, the distinctions are not always conceptually clear.
While the foregoing example suggests that sales to the general
public produce unrelated business income, the Service has also
ruled that a museum selling greeting card reproductions of recog-
nized works of art to members of the general public does not earn
unrelated business income, even if the cards are personalized,
because the reproduction of art work and the brief statement on
the back of the card identifying the work and the artist are treated
as substantially related to the museum's exempt educational pur-
pose."' This ruling raises the question of why the sale of pharma-
ceutical products or medical devices to members of the public is
not treated as contributing importantly to a hospital's exempt pur-
pose. 145 The same question arises with respect to the ruling that
sales of herb products by a section 501(c)(3) educational organiza-
tion were substantially related only if the sales were made to the
organization's members.
1 46
One reason for the lack of conceptual clarity is that the sub-
stantially related test serves to some degree as a proxy for an
unstated variable: whether engaging in the activity causes the
exempt organization to compete with a taxable entity providing
the same goods or services. Eliminating so-called "unfair competi-
tion" was the impetus for the introduction of the unrelated busi-
140. Treas. Reg. §1.513-1(d)(2).
141. Id.
142. Rev. Rul. 78-435, 1978-2 C.B. 181 (hospital's sale of hearing aids to patients
not taxable).
143. Rev. Rul. 68-374, 1968-2 C.B. 242.
144. Rev. Rul. 73-104, 1973-1 C.B. 263.
145. Rev. Rul. 68-374, 1968-2 C.B. 242.
146. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-36-002. This ruling appears to convert the convenience
exception into an element of the substantially related test.
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ness income tax.147 The most famous instance of what was
considered unfair competition was the creation of a company to
hold all the stock of C. F. Mueller Company and donate all the
pasta profits to the New York University Law School, thereby,
under the law as then in effect, avoiding taxation on such profits.
The Service litigated this case and lost, 14 but Congress subse-
quently amended the Code.
149
While preventing unfair competition with taxable entities is
the articulated policy purpose of the unrelated business income
tax provisions, evidence of such actual competition in each partic-
ular case is not one of the required elements in the definition of
unrelated business income.'5 ° Bowl committees have no taxable
competitors in the presentation of college football postseason
games, but this fact, even if established, would not in itself be suf-
ficient to exclude corporate sponsorship payments from unrelated
business income.' 8 ' Colleges, bowl committees, and other sports
associations are at least potentially competing with professional
sports franchises for corporate sponsorship revenue, although cor-
porate sponsors currently seem to find both professions and col-
lege teams sound investments.1
5 2
147. See S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1950), which states that
"[tihe problem at which the tax on UBI [unrelated business income] is directed is
primarily that of unfair competition." Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) follows the legislative
history in providing that "[t]he primary objective of the unrelated business income tax
was to eliminate a source of unfair competition by placing the unrelated business
activities of certain exempt organizations upon the same tax basis as the nonexempt
business endeavors with which they compete."
148. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'g 14 T.C. 922
(1950). Many other universities had similar arrangements involving assets as diverse
as a cotton gin and an airport. See Richard L. Kaplan, Intercollegiate Athletics and
the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 80 COLuM. L. Rav. 1430, 1432-34 (1980).
149. Revenue Act of 1950, Ch. 994, 64 Stat. 906. For a discussion of the process
leading to the replacement of the destination of income test with the unrelated
business income provisions, see Kenneth C. Elliasberg, Charity and Commerce:
Section 501(c)(3)-How Much Unrelated Business Activity, 21 TAx L. Rxv. 53, 74-76
(1965).
150. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) supports this view by providing:
in general, any activity of a section 511 organization which is carried on
for the production of income and which otherwise possesses the
characteristics required to constitute a trade or business within the
meaning of section 162-and which, in addition, is not substantially
related to the performance of exempt functions-presents sufficient
likelihood of unfair competition to be within the policy of the tax.
151. Comments by several bowl committees on the Service's initial position on
corporate sponsorship emphasized the absence of taxable competitors. See Comment
of the Southwest Conference (available electronically at 92 TNT 149-46).
152. The most controversial arrangement is the agreement between Texas
Stadium and Nike, which has resulted in litigation between National Football League
[Vol. 13:5
36
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 4
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol13/iss1/4
CORPORATE SPONSORSHIP
Conceptually, the policy concern with unfair competition
invites consideration of what activities are "commercial" in nature
so that they in fact compete with the business activities of taxable
entities. While the definition of unrelated trade or business pro-
vides that activities may be a trade or business but will not be
subject to tax unless they are not substantially related to the
organization's performance of its exempt purpose, nevertheless,
questions of the commercial character of particular activities
recur in the analysis of the unrelated business income tax. As was
discussed above, the regularly carried on element of the definition
explicitly includes consideration of the manner in which the activ-
ity is conducted. 153 The commerciality inquiry goes even further
by suggesting that certain activities are "inherently commercial"
and, by virtue of their inherently commercial nature, can never
satisfy the substantially related requirement. This line of reason-
ing attempts to use an essentialist argument to satisfy a rela-
tional test. While this is not the reasoning formally adopted in the
substantially related test, this essentialist element remains a sub-
text of many unrelated business income analyses.
154
('NFL"), through its licensing arm, NFL Properties, and Texas Stadium, the Dallas
Cowboys, and Cowboys owner, Jerry Jones. For the story thus far, see, Richard
Sandomir, Pro Football; Now Jerry Jones Must Prove How Smart Nike Deal Is, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 7, 1995, at B23; Leonard Shapiro, Nike's Exposure Is All Day, All Knight,
Wash. Post, Sept. 12, 1995, at E3; Christine Brennan, The Head Cowboy Tries To
Ride Alone; Dallas's Jerry Jones Bucks NFL Owners To Cut His Own Deals, Wash.
Post, Sept. 17, 1995, at Al; Christine Brennan, NFL Group Sues Cowboys, Owner
Jones; Licensing Arm Cites Nike, Pepsi Deals, Wash. Post, Sept 19, 1995, at Al;
Richard Hoffer, Cowboys for Sale; The NFL Is Not Amused by Maverick Owner Jerry
Jones, Sports Illustrated, Sept. 18, 1995, at 60; Richard Sandomir, N.F.L. Sues Jones
To Stop 'Ambush' Deals, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1995, at Bl; Richard Sandomir,
Cowboys' Jones Is Yielding No Ground, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1995, at B13. Nike
subsequently entered a licensing agreement with the NFL. See, Robert McAllister,
Nike Hits Paydirt with Team Sports; Contract with National Football League, 51
Footwear News 1 (Oct. 16, 1995); Dan Bickley, Sneaker Attack; Nike's Growing Clout
Feared, Chicago Sun-Times, Sept. 21, 1995 at 102. Jerry Jones and his critics have
confronted each other in the broadcast media. See, ABC News Nightline, Sept. 11,
1995 (transcript # 3731); National Public Radio Morining Edition, Sept. 15, 1995
(transcript # 1695-5).
In American Bar Endowment v. United States, 477 U.S. 105, 114-115 (1986), the
Supreme Court took the position that competition might be indirect or potential. See
supra at note 115.
153. See supra at Part V(A)(2).
154. The Subcommittee on Oversight, Press Release 16, March 31, 1988
(available electronically at 88 TNT 73-10), discussed a possible reform of the
substantially related test that would have developed specific statutory provisions
with respect to certain activities "whose nature and scope are inherently commercial,
rather than charitable." The Draft UBIT Report of June 23, 1988 (available
electronically at 88 TNT 132-5), prepared by the Subcommittee Chair, J.J. Pickle (D-
Tx.) and ranking minority member Richard Schulze (R-Pa.) adopted this approach of
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As the following discussion of advertising illustrates, there is
little scope for arguing that entering into a corporate sponsorship
arrangement is substantially related to an organization's exempt
purpose.
4. Advertising as an Unrelated Trade or Business
The Service has analyzed advertising within the general prin-
ciples of the unrelated business income tax. 15 Advertising raises
three issues that are also at the core of the corporate sponsorship
debate. First, what factors distinguish advertising from the
acknowledgement of a contribution? Second, is the message in the
purported advertisement substantially related to the organiza-
tion's exempt purpose? Third, is the purported advertising activ-
ity regularly carried on?
The first issue, whether a display constitutes advertising, has
arisen most commonly in the context of the sale of advertising
space in journals published by an exempt organization. In its ini-
tial ruling on this issue, the Service took the position that listings
of business names and addresses constituted advertising, reason-
ing that
The fact that the message published may not be commercial
in nature may not be determinative. There are many forms
of institutional messages designed for the promotion of good
will which do not directly refer to any commercial product or
service, but merely identify the particular enterprise or
institution involved. The controlling factor in this case is
that the activities giving rise to the income in question con-
stitute the sale and performance of a valuable service on the
part of the publisher, and the purchase of that service on the
part of the other party to the transaction.1
5 6
However, not all displays of the name of a contributor have
been treated as advertising. Some displays have, in effect, been
treated as acknowledgements. For example, a list of contributors,
with sixty names appearing on each page, in a limited circulation
journal of a section 501(c)(3) organization magazine was not
treated as advertising.'5 7 With respect to such listings, the Ser-
vice reasoned:
listing certain activities that would in all cases be taxable while retaining the
substantially related test. Id.
155. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(iv), Examples (6) and (7).
156. Rev. Rul. 74-38, 1974-1 C.B. 144.
157. Rev. Rul. 76093, 1976-1 C.B. 170, clarifying Rev. Rul. 74-38, 1974-1 C.B.
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the purchaser of a listing neither expects nor receives more
than an inconsequential benefit therefrom. Any commercial
benefit that could reasonably be expected to be derived from
the appearance of the commercial name along with at least
59 others on a single page cannot be considered as other
than negligible and inconsequential in view of the type of
publication that the organization's journal is and the nature
of the solicitation that resulted in the payments associated
therewith.
158
However, full-page or half-page displays, or displays in blocked-in
spaces were treated as advertising. 159 The Service reasoned with
respect to these displays that the businesses identified in these
displays reasonably expect and receive some consequential
amount of commercial benefit from their payments to the organi-
zation. Although some of these firms may have been motivated, in
part, by charitable purposes in making their payments, the over-
all appearance and setting of their distinctly located notices
clearly tend to give such notices a definite business aspect and
thus provide a logical basis for concluding that the firms identified
therein expect to receive more than an inconsequential amount of
commercial benefit therefrom.
160
In sum, the Service has looked to the facts and circumstances
of each case to determine whether the organization has provided a
benefit in the form of business promotion in exchange for a pay-
ment. While the identification of a business creates a presump-
tion that the payment was made in exchange for a benefit in the
form of advertising, others factors beyond the mere identification
of the payor must be considered. These factors include "the man-
ner in which the publication under consideration is normally cir-
culated; the territorial scope of such circulation; the extent to
which its readers, promoters, or the like could reasonably be
expected to further the commercial interests of the advertisers by
either direct or indirect means; the eligibility or noneigibility of
the publishing organization for the receipt of tax deductible contri-
butions; and the commercial or noncommercial flavor of the meth-
ods used to solicit the advertising patronage in question. " 1 6 1
158. Rev. Rul. 76-93, 1976-1 C.B. 170 (such listings were solicited from
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Ultimately, no one factor relating to the manner in which a con-
tributor is identified is determinative.
Addressing the second factor, whether activity associated
with displays that are not treated as acknowledgements can
escape the unrelated business income tax by satisfying the sub-
stantially related test, the Service has consistently taken the posi-
tion that advertising is not substantially related to organizations'
exempt purposes. The Service treats this situation as one exam-
ple of the appropriate application of the "fragmentation rule" of
section 513(c), which provides that an unrelated trade or business
can be disaggregated from associated activities that may be sub-
stantially related to an organization's exempt purpose.
1 6 2
The regulations on the substantially related test contain two
examples based on such advertising in a periodical, the editorial
content of which was substantially related to the organization's
exempt purpose.16 3 In the first example, a section 501(c)(6) organ-
ization'1' publishes a monthly journal "containing articles and
162. I.R.C. § 513(c) states
For purposes of this section, the term 'trade or business' includes any
activity which is carried on for the production of income from the sale of
goods or the performance of services. For purposes of the preceding
sentence, an activity does not lose [its] identity as a trade or business
merely because it is carried on within a larger aggregate of similar
activities or within a larger complex of other endeavors which may, or
may not, be related to the exempt purposes of the organization. Where
an activity carried on for profit constitutes an unrelated trade or
business, no part of such trade or business shall be excluded from such
classification merely because it does not result in profit.
In addition to advertising, the fragmentation rule is commonly applied to sales by
university bookstores and gift shops in museums and hospitals. See, e.g., Rev. Rul.
85-110, 1985-2 C.B. 166 (laboratory services for private patients of staff physicians
not substantially related to hospital's exempt purpose); Rev. Rul. 81-62, 1981-1 C.B.
355 (beauty shop substantially related to exempt purpose of senior citizens center but
sale of heavy appliances such as stoves and refrigerators was not); Rev. RUl. 80-297,
1980-2 C.B. 196 (summer tennis camp operated by school's employees not substan-
tially related to school's exempt purpose); Rev. Rul. 80-298, 1980-2 C.B. 197 (lease of
university's football stadium to professional team and the provision of substantial
services to the team was not substantially related to university's exempt purpose);
Rev. RUl. 78-98, 1987-1 C.B. 167 (fees from public for use of school's ski facility unre-
lated business income); Rev. Rul. 73-587, 1973-2 C.B. 192 (pet grooming and boarding
services not substantially related to humane society's exempt purpose); Rev. Rul. 73-
105, 1973-1 C.B. 264 (sale of art books substantially related to exempt purpose of
museum but sale of souvenirs of city in which museum located not substantially
related). See Examination Guidelines for Colleges and Universities, Ann. 94-112,
1994-37 I.R. B. 1 at § 342.(13), for the very limited application of the fragmentation
rule to college bookstores in light of the generally controlling convenience exception.
163. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(iv), Examples (6) and (7).
164. I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) deals with business leagues, trade associations, and
professional associations. See Hill and Kirschten supra note 17 at Chap. 7. The
[Vol. 13:5
40
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 4
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol13/iss1/4
CORPORATE SPONSORSHIP
other editorial material which contribute importantly to the
accomplishment of purposes for which exempt is granted the
organization."165 Consequently, income from the sale of subscrip-
tions to members and others in not treated as unrelated business
income. 166 The example provides that the trade association "also
derives income from the regular sale of space and services for gen-
eral consumer advertising, including advertising of such products
as soft drinks, automobiles, articles of apparel, and home appli-
ances."16 7 The regulation takes the position that the advertising
activity is not substantially related to the accomplishment of the
organization's exempt purpose, and, consequently, the advertising
income is taxable.
1 6 8
The second example raises the more difficult issue where the
content of the advertising is more closely tailored to the editorial
content of the magazine and thus to the exempt purpose of the
organization. 69 In this example, a section 501(c)(6) organization
limits advertising in its journal to "products which are within the
general area of professional interest of its members."1 70  The
example further states:
Following a practice common among taxable magazines
which publish advertising, [the organization] requires its
advertising to comply with certain general standards of
taste, fairness, and accuracy; but within those limits the
form, content, and manner of presentation of the advertising
Service and the courts apply the general requirements of the unrelated business
income tax to all organizations. However, the substantially related test requires that
the determination be linked to an analysis of each organization's exempt purpose.
Nevertheless, the substantially related test has not supported distinctions among
types of exempt organizations with respect to advertising.
165. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(iv), Example (6).
166. The fragmentation rule does not require allocation of part of the
subscription income to advertising such as on the basis of the percentage of pages or
lines devoted to advertising and the percentage devoted to editorial content.
Similarly, application of the fragmentation rule to corporate sponsorship does not
require that ticket income or even the broadcast revenue received by the event
organizers be allocated in part to the presence of advertising.
167. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(iv), Example 6.
168. Id. The regulation concludes
Neither the publication of such advertisements nor the performance of
services for such commercial advertisers contributes importantly to the
accomplishment of any purpose for which exemption is granted-
Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the production of income from
advertising utilizes the circulation developed and maintained in
performance of exempt functions, such income is gross income from
unrelated trade or business.
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messages are governed by the basic objective of the advertis-
ers to promote the sale of the advertised products. While the
advertisements contain certain information, the informa-
tional function of the advertising is incidental to the control-
ling aim of stimulating demand for the advertised products
and differs in no essential respect from the informational
function of any commercial advertising. Like taxable pub-
lishers of advertising, [the organization] accepts advertising
only from those who are willing to pay its prescribed rates.
Although continuing education of its members in matters
pertaining to their profession is one of the purposes for
which [the organization] is granted exemption, the publica-
tion of advertising designed and selected in the manner of
ordinary commercial advertising is not an educational activ-
ity of the kind contemplated by the exemption statute; it dif-
fers fundamentally from such an activity both in its
governing objective and in its method. Accordingly, [the
organization's] publication of advertising does not contribute
importantly to the accomplishment of its exempt purposes;
and the income which it derives from advertising constitutes
gross income from unrelated trade or business.
171
In American College of Physicians, the Supreme Court
decided a case based on essentially similar facts.172 The American
College of Physicians ("ACP") was exempt under section 501(c)(3).
It published a monthly professional journal, The Annals of Inter-
nal Medicine (the "Annals"), each issue of which contained "adver-
tisements for pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and equipment
useful in the practice of internal medicine," which appeared in two
clusters, one at the beginning and the other at the end of the mag-
azine.17 3 The Court noted that the ACP had "a longstanding pol-
icy of accepting only advertisements containing information about
the use of medical products, and screens proffered advertisements
for accuracy and relevance to internal medicine." 74 In holding
that the advertising was not substantially related to ACP's
exempt purpose, the Court relied on Treas. Reg. §1.513-1(d)(4)(iv),
Example (7) and section 513(c).
175
171. Id.
172. United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834 (1986).
173. Id. at 836.
174. Id.
175. The Court noted that section 513(c) was enacted in 1969 in response to the
controversy that had surrounded promulgation of the regulation in 1967. The Court
treated this subsequent action by Congress as legislative approval of the approach
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The central controversy in American College of Physicians
was whether the regulation created a per se rule that all advertis-
ing is an unrelated trade or business, or whether this determina-
tion was to be made on the facts and circumstances of each
particular case. In resolving this question, the Court found The
interpretative difficulty of Example 7 arises primarily from its
failure to distinguish clearly between the statements intended to
provide hypothetical facts and those designed to posit the neces-
sary legal consequence of those facts. Just at the point in the
lengthy Example at which the facts would appear to end and the
analysis to begin, a pivotal statement appears: "the informational
function of the advertising is incidental to the controlling aim of
stimulating demand for the advertised products." The Govern-
ment's position depends upon reading this statement as a general
proposition of law, while respondent would read it as a statement
of fact that may be true by hypothesis of "Z" [the organization in
the regulation] and its journal, but is not true of Annals. 176 The
Court also found the legislative history of the 1969 Act inconclu-
sive on the question of a per se rule, although not inconclusive on
the question of the validity of the regulation in question. 177 It also
found that the Service had relied on case-by-case determinations
with respect to advertising income. 178 The Court thus rejected the
Service's claim that the regulation created a permissible per se
rule.
179
However, in considering the facts and circumstances of the
advertising in the ACP's journal, the Annals, the Court held that
the advertisements were not substantially related to the organiza-
tion's exempt purposes; consequently, the advertising income was
subject to the unrelated business income tax.180 The Court did
observe, consistent with its holding that each case was to be ana-
lyzed on its own facts
This is not to say that the College could not control its publi-
cation of advertisements in such a way as to reflect an inten-
tion to contribute importantly to its educational functions.
By coordinating the content of the advertisements with the
editorial content of the issue, or by publishing only adver-
tisements reflecting new developments in the pharmaceuti-
cal market, for example, perhaps the College could satisfy
176. Id. at 843.
177. Id. at 846-47.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 847.
180. Id. at 849.
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the stringent standards erected by Congress and the
Treasury.'"'
Consistent with its previous positions and the Court's hold-
ing, the Service has applied the facts and circumstance approach
mandated by the Court in its subsequent rulings.18 2 None of these
rulings has treated listings providing any greater identification
than the mere listing of a company's name as an acknowledge-
ment rather than as advertising.8 3 The proposed regulations on
corporate sponsorship thus represent a marked departure from its
ruling position with respect to print advertising in exempt organi-
zation journals. 1
84
The third factor, whether the activity was regularly carried
on, has provided the basis for excluding income from certain types
of advertising from unrelated business income. For example, the
Service has ruled that advertisements sold by an exempt organi-
zation's regular paid staff during the four months preceding the
eight-month concert season and appearing in a weekly concert
program during the season was regularly carried on.'8 5 Similarly,
the solicitation of advertising for an exempt organization's year-
book was treated as regularly carried on when the solicitation was
conducted throughout the year by a commercial firm and the year-
book itself was distributed throughout the year.'8 6  However,
solicitations by volunteers for advertisements in an organization's
annual yearbook, which was distributed at the organization's
annual dinner dance, was not regularly carried on. 18 7 These rul-
ings suggest that the Service will treat advertising as not regu-
larly carried on only if the solicitation is not commercial in
181. Id. at 849-50. This statement seemed to address the concerns expressed in
the concurring opinion by then Chief Justice Burger and then Justice Powell.
182. See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-37-002 (Apr. 29, 1991) and Gen. Couns. Mem.
39,860 (Sept. 26, 1991) (advertising in football programs); Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-48-054
(Mar. 6, 1991) (advertising in local bar association journal not include legal notices);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-05-037 (Nov. 6, 1991) (advertising in advertising industry journal
not substantially related); Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-34-002 (Feb. 19, 1992) ("message"
notice are advertising); Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-04-001 (Sept. 29, 1992) ("clustering" of
some notices does not make them mere listings).
183. See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-45-004 (July 27, 1993), in which the Service
ruled that a "yellow pages" listing was advertising because it contained the fax
number, telephone number, and name of the company sales representative for each
company listed.
184. See infra at Part VII(B) for a discussion of the proposed regulations.
185. Rev. Rul. 75-200, 1975-1 C.B. 163.
186. Rev. Rul. 73-424, 1973-2 C.B. 190.
187. Rev. Rul. 75-201, 1975-1 C.B. 164. It appears that the income would not be
includable in any case due to the volunteer exception of I.R.C. § 513(a).
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manner, relatively short in duration, and the advertising appears
in a program that is distributed at an event that is also of short
duration.
Based on these precedents, the Service took the position that
income from the advertising appearing in the program for the
NCAA Men's Final Four was unrelated business income. 188
While the Tax Court held that the Service was correct, the Court
of Appeals reversed.' 8 9 The Tenth Circuit's NCAA decision and
the Service's nonacquiescence have left the law in this area
unresolved. 190
For purposes of computing the amount of unrelated business
taxable income, advertising in exempt organization journals is
subject to the favorable rules applicable to activities that exploit
an exempt function. 191 These provisions are an exception to the
general requirement that any amount deducted from unrelated
business income must be directly connected with the unrelated
business activities producing the income.' 92 The concept of an
unrelated business activity that exploits an exempt function per-
mits an exempt organization to deduct from unrelated business
income any amount of its exempt function expenses in excess of its
exempt function income. 193 This concept has been applied exclu-
sively in the case of advertising in exempt function journals where
certain expenses associated with the production of the editorial
content of the magazine may be deducted from the advertising
revenue, thereby reducing the amount of unrelated business taxa-
ble income.1
9 4
188. National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 456
(1989).
189. National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Commissioner, 914 F. 2d 1417
(10th Cir. 1990). See Hill and Kirschten supra note 17 at 10.02(2] for a critique of
the court's reasoning in this case.
190. AOD 1991-015 (July 3, 1991). See also Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-34-002 (Feb. 19,
1992XService states that it "will continue to litigate the issue in appropriate cases").
See Hill and Kirschten supra note 17 at 10.02[2] for a discussion of the current state
of the regularly carried on test.
191. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-l(d).
192. LR.C. § 512(a)(1) and Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-l(a).
193. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-1(d)(2).
194. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-l(f). For a discussion of these rules applied to print
advertising, see Hill and Kirschten supra note 17 at 10.07(3].
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B. Special Exceptions to the Definition of Unrelated
Business Income
The three-part statutory test discussed above is subject to two
broad categories of statutory modifications and exceptions. The
first category consists of statutory modifications under section
512(b). These modifications apply to types of income that, under
many common fact patterns, do not constitute unrelated business
income. However, under other fact patterns, such income would
be unrelated business income within the general rules. The statu-
tory modifications are intended to define the situations in which
the general rules are not likely to apply while not foreclosing their
application under other facts. These modifications are generally
expressed in provisions drafted as broad principles, not as specific
rules. The second category consists of statutory exceptions set
forth in section 513 that apply to types of income that clearly fall
within the statutory definition of unrelated business income. The
statutory exceptions simply provide that such types of income will
not be subject to tax. These provisions tend to be drafted as much
more narrowly-crafted and fully-specified rules. The following dis-
cussion of these special statutory exceptions highlights the limita-
tions of the general rules and invites consideration of the tension
between general principles and particular cases in the statutory
structure of the unrelated business income tax.
1. Statutory Modifications
The statutory modifications of section 512(b) in several
instances resolve disputes that could be resolved within the gen-
eral definition of unrelated business income. These modifications
are thus more matters of efficiency of tax administration and cer-
tainty for exempt organization taxpayers than of departures from
the general principles.
Several of these modifications extend the principle that
income from passive investment activities is not unrelated busi-
ness income. For example, the Service has generally taken the
position that investment activities of exempt organizations are not
a trade or business activity, and this is clarified in section
512(b)(1), which excludes interest, dividends and certain other
forms of investment income.
Similarly, by extension of the distinction between a trade or
business and the passive receipt of investment income, the receipt
of royalty income from licensing agreements is considered not to
be a trade or business because the organization plays a passive
[Vol. 13:5
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role.' 95 What arrangements qualify as royalties rather than as
the provision of goods or services are currently in dispute, espe-
cially with respect to affinity credit cards and the provision of
mailing lists.
196
The Cotton Bowl Committee attempted to argue that it had
not sold advertising to Mobil, but that Mobil had instead paid the
Committee a royalty for the use of the Cotton Bowl name and logo
in its advertising. 197 This approach contains elements of plausi-
bility but ultimately fails. This royalty argument, in effect,
reverses the transaction so that Mobil is no longer purchasing the
right to display its name and logo, but is instead purchasing the
right to use the Cotton Bowl's name and logo. To the extent that
Mobil purchased, in the corporate sponsorship agreement, the
right to use the Cotton Bowl logo as it saw fit, this analysis is
consistent with the Mobil Cotton Bowl agreement. However, even
in this case, Mobil purchased more than the right to use the logo;
it purchased the right to display its name and logo in a particular
setting at a particular event with specified forms of broadcast cov-
erage. The Cotton Bowl did not simply agree to allow Mobil to use
its logo but actively participated in the Mobil display of its logo at
the game itself and in the associated publicity and game pro-
grams. This kind of active involvement of the Cotton Bowl Com-
mittee takes the corporate sponsorship transaction, at least in the
football bowl game setting, out of the passive licensing arrange-
ments to which royalty analysis properly applies. The question
here is whether the corporate sponsor would purchase the right to
display the bowl game logo if it did not also have the right to dis-
play its own logo at the game.198 One approach might be to bifur-
195. LR.C. § 512(b)(2). What constitutes a royalty is a matter of intense
contemporary dispute. See Hill and Kirschten supra note 17 at 10.04[1].
196. Sierra Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 307 (1994). For the Service's
position, see Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-21-005 (Feb. 23, 1993) (affinity credit card).
197. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 (Aug. 16, 1991).
198. The Olympic Games' licensing of its name and logo for use by sponsors in
their own advertisements might seem to offer a case for royalty treatment. However,
in its comments to the Service on the proposed audit guidelines on corporate
sponsorship, the United States Olympic Committee discussed the linkage between
the use of its logo by sponsors and payments it receives from the same sponsors to
display their names and logos at Olympic events (comment available electronically at
92 TNT 163-81). For discussions of similar linkages between the display of the
organization's name or logo by the corporate sponsor and the organization's display of
the corporate sponsor's name and logo, see the Comment on the proposed audit
guidelines by the United States Gymnastics Federation, which is a National
Governing Body recognized by the United States Olympic Committee under the
Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U.S.C. secs. 391(a) and 392 (comment available
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cate corporate sponsorship payments into a royalty element that
is not taxable and an advertising component that is subject to the
unrelated business income tax. This approach would raise signifi-
cant allocation issues.
Receipt of income from the rental of real property is also
excluded from unrelated business income, largely on grounds that
it is not a trade or business because it is passive and akin to
investment income. 199 However, the income from the rental of
personal property does not fall within this exception unless it is
rented in connection with the rental of real property.200 The
rental income rules are set forth with the level of detail more char-
acteristic of the exclusion provisions of section 513 than with the
statutory modifications of section 512(b). This reflects the more
tenuous grounding of the exception in the general principles of the
unrelated business income tax.
Gain or loss on the sale of property is also excluded. 20 1 This
exception does not apply to sale of stock in trade or other property
properly includable in inventory2 2 or to the sale of "property held
primarily for the sale to customers in the ordinary course of the
trade or business."2 0 3 This modification is akin to the regularly
carried on requirement and has elements of an argument that the
sale of property is not a trade or business.
The exclusion of research income from unrelated business
income rests on the educational aspects of research. The three
exceptions do not apply to applied research, which is treated as a
trade or business. Section 512(b) contains three distinct excep-
tions for research income. The first exception applies to income
from any research performed by a college, university, or hospi-
tal.20 4 The second exception applies to income from research per-
formed for the United States government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, or for any state or its political subdivisions by
any exempt organization.20 5  The third exception applies to
income from research performed by an exempt organization "oper-
electronically at 92 TNT 163-78) and the Comment on the proposed audit guidelines
of the PGA Tour, Inc. (comment available electronically at 92 TNT 163-58).
199. I.R.C. § 512(b)(3).
200. LR.C. § 512(bX3)(A)(i). However, a limited amount of rental income from
personal property rented with real property can be excluded from unrelated business
income under I.R.C. § 512(b)(3)(A)(ii).
201. I.R.C. § 512(b)(5).
202. LR.C. § 512(b)(5)(A) and Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-l(d)(1).
203. LR.C. § 512(b)(5XB) and Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-l(d)(1).
204. I.R.C. § 512(b)(8).
205. LR.C. § 512(b)(7).
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ated primarily for purposes of carrying on fundamental
research."20 6 To qualify for this exception, the results of the
research must be "freely available to the general public."2 °7
These exceptions for research income derive from the general
principle that research is not a trade or business. The exceptions
for research performed by colleges, universities, or hospitals and
for research performed for federal or state governments are also
based on claims that the research in question fulfills the organiza-
tion's exempt purpose, including relieving the burdens of
government.
Apart from the royalty provision discussed above, none of the
statutory modifications applies to corporate sponsorship. This is
not surprising since these modifications generally clarify the
application of the general statutory principles, under which corpo-
rate sponsorship payments are likely to be treated as unrelated
business income to the recipient organizations, rather than
departing from such principles.
2. Statutory Exceptions
The statutory exceptions all appear in section 513 and apply
to very specific situations that would result in unrelated business
income under the general rules.20 8 The exceptions are the volun-
teer exception, the contributed property exception, the conven-
ience exception, the low-cost items exception, the bingo exception,
the public entertainment exception, and the trade show exception.
While each of these exceptions can find some basis in extension of
the general definitional principles of the unrelated business
income tax, application of these general principles would, in most
cases, have resulted in treating the activities as unrelated trade or
business activities. Thus, the Section 513 exceptions do not so
much extend the general principles as reverse the effect of their
application to very particularized fact patterns. Each of these
statutory exceptions is discussed below.
The volunteer exception provides that an activity will not be
treated as an unrelated trade or business if "substantially all of
the work in carrying on such trade or business is performed for
the organization without compensation."20 9 The Service has
applied the volunteer exception to income from the operation of
206. I.R.C. § 512(b)(9).
207. Id.
208. See Hill and Kirschten supra note 17 at 10.03.
209. I.R.C. § 513(a)(1) and Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(e)(1).
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thrift shops or gift shops operated by volunteers. 210 The Service
has interpreted the volunteer exception strictly in refusing to
apply it if volunteer labor "is not a material income-producing fac-
tor."211 However, minimal amounts of work by an organization's
paid staff members will not preclude application of the volunteer
exception.212
The contributed property exception provides that income from
the sale of merchandise, "substantially all of which has been
received by the organization as gifts or contributions," is not sub-
ject to the unrelated business income tax.213 This exception has
been applied to thrift shops selling donated merchandise and to
auctions of donated items at fundraising events.214
The convenience exception applies to a trade or business car-
ried on "primarily for the convenience of its members, students,
patients, officers or employees." 21 5 Examples include hospital
pharmacies selling items used primarily by patients21 6 and college
bookstores.2 17
Certain low-cost items distributed in connection with fun-
draising efforts are not treated as having been sold to generate
revenue under the low-cost items exception. 218 The regulations
treat the distribution of such low-cost items as not a trade or
business.219
Income from operating bingo games is not taxable as unre-
lated business income if the games are not operated in a commer-
cial manner and do not violate any state or local law.2 20 Certain
religious organizations historically raised funds by operating
bingo games, and the bingo exception responded to assertions that
these church-related social and fundraising activities should not
210. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(e). See also Rev. Rul. 80-106, 1980-1 C.B. 113.
211. Rev. Rul. 78-144, 1978-1 C.B. 168 (heavy equipment leasing).
212. Tech. Adv. Mem. 82-11-002 (n.).
213. I.R.C. § 513(a)(3) and Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(e)(3).
214. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(e).
215. I.R.C. § 513(a)(2) and Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(e)(2).
216. Rev. Rul. 68-374, 1968-2 C.B. 242.
217. Rev. Rul. 58-194, 1958-1 C.B. 240.
218. I.R.C. § 513(h).
219. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) states
where an activity does not possess the characteristics of a trade or
business within the meaning of section 162, such as when an
organization sends out low cost articles incidental to the solicitation of
charitable contributions, the unrelated business income tax does not
apply since the organizations is not in competition with taxable
organizations.
220. I.R.C. § 513(M) and Treas. Reg. § 1.513-5.
[Vol. 13:5
50
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 4
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol13/iss1/4
CORPORATE SPONSORSHIP
be taxed. No other games of chance fall within this bingo
exception.22 '
The public entertainment exception applies to events at state
or county fairs.222 Events such as horse races, auto races, or musi-
cal entertainment might not be substantially related to the educa-
tional or civic purposes of the section 501(c)(3) or section 501(c)(4)
organizations that organize such fairs. The public entertainment
exception does not attempt to establish that such events are sub-
stantially related to the exempt purposes of the main body of fair
activities, such as agricultural education or civic betterment, but
instead simply provides that income from such events is not sub-
ject to the unrelated business income tax. The statute invokes the
tradition and custom of presenting such events at exempt fairs.223
The trade show exception is also based on a reference to the
types of activities traditionally carried on at trade shows.224
Again, the exception is not based on the assertion that the activi-
ties themselves are educational, but that they are traditional and
attract persons to the trade show at which other activities will be
educational.
These statutory exceptions are all drafted to apply to nar-
rowly-defined fact patterns. Thus, none of these exceptions
applies to corporate sponsorship in their current form. The closest
analogue is the Section 513(d)(2) public entertainment exception.
However, these statutory exceptions provide a model for a nar-
rowly-drafted statutory exception for corporate sponsorship.
221. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-5(d) defines "bingo games" for this purpose. See Tech.
Adv. Mem. 86-02-001 (Feb. 27, 1985) (pultabs are not covered by the bingo exception).
222. I.R.C. § 513(d)(2).
223. I.R.C. § 513(d)(2)(A) defines a public entertainment activity as
any entertainment or recreational activity of a kind traditionally
conducted at fairs or expositions promoting agricultural or educational
purposes, including, but not limited to, any activity one of the purposes of
which is to attract the public to fairs or expositions or to promote the
breeding of animals or the development of products or equipment.
224. I.R.C. § 513(d)(3)(A) defines convention or trade show activity as
any activity of a kind traditionally conducted at conventions, annual
meetings, or trade shows, including, but not limited to, any activity one of
the purposes of which is to attract persons in an industry generally
(without regard to membership in the sponsoring organization) as well as
members of the public to the show for the purpose of displaying industry
products or to stimulate interest in, and demand for, industry products or
services, or to educate persons engaged in the industry in the
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C. Unrelated Business Income and Exempt Status
Unrelated business income can jeopardize an organization's
exempt status even if the organization pays the full amount of the
unrelated business income tax. Exempt status is jeopardized not
by nonpayment of tax, but by the organization's not operating
"exclusively" for an exempt purpose. 225 This is a potentially sig-
nificant problem for the bowl committees, which appear to earn a
significant share of their revenue from corporate sponsorship pay-
ments. Museums, universities, and other organizations that
receive corporate sponsorship payments are less likely to face this
problem because they generally receive a lesser share of their
total revenue from corporate sponsorship payments. However,
the issue is potentially not limited to the bowl committees. For
example, the Guthrie Theater of Minneapolis, received approxi-
mately one-sixth of its 1991 budget from business, although it is
not clear what share of that might be considered a corporate spon-
sorship payment. 22 The Boston Symphony Orchestra raised
approximately 7.5 percent of its $38 million operating budget from
corporate underwriting of individual concerts and tours. 2 7 The
Princeton University Art Museum reported at it must finance all
of its exhibitions and programs from sources outside the univer-
sity.22 8 Approximately one-sixth of the annual operating budget
of a community arts program offered by the University of Califor-
nia at Davis is provided by corporations.229
The regulations set forth inconsistent requirements. The reg-
ulations under section 501(c)(3) provide that such organizations
must be "organized and operated exclusively" for one or more
exempt purposes,2 3 0 but defines "exclusively" as primarily,23 ' and
"primarily" as all but an insubstantial part.23 2 These formula-
225. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) requires that an I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
organization be "both organized and operated exclusively" for an exempt purpose.
226. Comment by the Guthrie Theater on the proposed audit guidelines
(available electronically at 92 TNT 163-87).
227. Comments of the Boston Symphony Orchestra on proposed audit guidelines
(available electronically at 92 TNT 163-64).
228. Comments of the Art Museum of Princeton University on proposed audit
guidelines (available electronically at 92 TNT 149-66).
229. University of California at Davis comments on proposed audit guidelines
(available electronically at 92 TNT 149-34).
230. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1).
231. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) provides that "an organization will be
regarded as 'operated exclusively' for one or more exempt purpose only if it engages
primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes."
232. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(1) provides that an organization will not be
regarded as operated "primarily" for one or more exempt purposes "if more than an
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tions are far from precise, but are generally taken to mean that
only an insubstantial part of the activities of a section 501(c)(3)
organization can be for nonexempt purposes, including unrelated
trade or business activities.
The unrelated business income tax regulations simply provide
that an organization may not be operated "primarily" for an unre-
lated business purpose.233 The regulations do not limit primarily
to only an insubstantial part.23 4 Thus, the language of the regula-
tion referring specifically to the unrelated business activities of
section 501(c)(3) organizations might be read as permitting an
exempt organization to engage in unrelated business activity that
is substantial but not primary, which is to say does not account for
more than half of the organization's activities or income or both.
The Service has not clarified this issue. In Revenue Ruling
64-182, the Service ruled that an organization's exempt activities
must be "commensurate in scope with its financial resources."23 5
While the Service stated that this would serve as interim gui-
dance, it has since issued no additional precedential guidance.236
The Service has reiterated its position that whether exempt activi-
ties are commensurate in scope is a factual question.237
The courts have rarely considered this issue and in the few
decided cases have read the reference to "primarily" in the unre-
lated business regulations as consistent with the reference in the
general operational requirements for exemption, so that exempt
organizations may not engage in more than an insubstantial
insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose." Treas.
Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(1)(i)(b) provides that an organization will be treated as
organized for exempt purposes if"an insubstantial part of its activities" are unrelated
to its exempt purpose.
233. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e) provides that an organization will satisfy the
requirements of section 501(c)(3) "if the organization is not organized or operated for
the primary purpose of carrying on an unrelated trade or business, as defined in
section 513."
234. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1) states with respect to unrelated business
activities: "In determining the existence or nonexistence of such primary purpose, all
the circumstances must be considered, including the size and extent of the trade or
business and the size and extent of the activities which are in furtherance of one or
more exempt purposes."
235. Rev. Rul 64-182, 1964-2 C.B. 186.
236. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34682 (Nov. 17, 1971).
237. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34682 (Nov. 17, 1971)(advising against issuing a
revenue ruling). See also, Gen. Couns. Mein. 38742 (June 3, 1981)(the commensurate
in scope test applied to fundraising events).
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amount of unrelated business activity.2 38 They have not provided
further guidance on the commensurate in scope standard.
The danger that corporate sponsorship payment might jeop-
ardize exempt status is a significant factor fueling the effort to
exclude corporate sponsorship payments from taxation as unre-
lated business income.
VI. CORPORATE SPONSORSHIP PAYMENTS AS UNRELATED
BusiNEss INCOME: APPLYING THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES
As the foregoing analysis based on the transactional model
suggests, the most straightforward approach to corporate sponsor-
ship arrangements is to determine whether, based on the facts
and circumstances of each case, the organization was engaged in
an unrelated trade or business that it regularly carried on. This
was the approach the Service took in its initial ruling on corporate
sponsorship.
The controversy over corporate sponsorship began in earnest
when the Service ruled that payments made by Mobil Oil to the
Cotton Bowl Committee constituted the purchase of advertising
and that, consequently, the Cotton Bowl Committee was taxable
on the payment from Mobil because it had been received in
exchange for the sale of advertising.239  Although heavily
redacted, the ruling turned on a contract with most of the ele-
ments discussed above in describing a generic corporate sponsor-
ship agreement. The ruling states that the contract "recites the
mutual receipt of valuable, good and sufficient consideration."
240
The ruling turned on whether the Cotton Bowl provided Mobil
with a quid pro quo for its contribution. While the Service agreed
with the bowl committee that Mobil's intent is not determinative,
it nevertheless looked to the payor's expectation of a "substantial
238. See, e.g., Orange County Agric. Soc., Inc. v. Commissioner, 893 F. 2d 529
(2d Cir. 1990), affg 55 T.C.M. 1602 (1988). The Second Circuit held that 29 percent to
35 percent of a fair association's revenue derived from auto races held outside of the
fair's operation was not an "insubstantia amount of unrelated business income for
purposes of Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c). 893 F. 2d at 531, 533-34. Neither court
referred to Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e). The Second Circuit held that the public
entertainment activity exception of I.R.C. §513(d)(2) applied only to the auto races
held in direct connection with the county fair. 893 F. 2d at 532-33.
239. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 (Aug. 16, 1991). While the ruling was made
public by the Service in a severely redacted form and while all published rulings are
redacted to protect the identity of the taxpayer to which it was issued, Mobil and its
attorneys have made the full ruling public and the ruling is commonly referred to as
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return benefit" to determine whether there was a quid pro quo or a
mere acknowledgement.24 '
The bowl committee argued that the benefits received by
Mobil were "mere recognition of a donor's generosity" and not a
"substantial return benefit" because providing the benefits pro-
vided in the contract involved relatively little extra time or effort
by the bowl committee.242 The Service rejected a test based on
incremental effort and looked instead to whether the value of the
benefit was "commensurate in value" with the payment.2 43 It also
found that "the benefits provided in this case are significantly dif-
ferent from the types of donor recognition previously recognized
by the Service as insignificant."2'
The bowl committee also argued that unrelated business
income arose only where an exempt organization competed with a
taxable entity.245 Arguing that it was not competing with any tax-
able entity, the bowl committee took the position that unrelated
business income tax was improper in this case. The Service
rejected both prongs of this position. The Service stated flatly that
"there is no requirement that unfair competition be present in
order to tax the proceeds from an activity."246 Alternatively, the
Service argued that the bowl committee was competing unfairly
241. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 (Aug. 16, 1991) states
The Organization argues that the * * * payment is a gift or contribution
that was made with no expectation of a return in the way of goods or
services. The Organization also argues that the donative intent or lack
thereof on the part of * * * is not determinative of the treatment to be
accorded the payments by the Organization. Accordingly, we agree with
the Organization that regardless of the subject intent of* * * which we do
not know, and regardless of how * * * treated the payment on its federal
income tax return, which we also do not know, the question to be resolved
here is whether the payment was in exchange for goods and/or services
provided by the Organization. In other words, did the Organization
provide a quid pro quo in exchange for the payment from * * *. The
appropriate way to answer this question is to look at all the facts and
circumstances to see if the payment was made with an expectation of
receiving from the Organization a substantial return benefit.
Id.
242. Id. In effect, the Cotton Bowl Committee attempted to base the
determination of whether it was conducting a trade or business on the amount of
activity and not on the profit motive test adopted by the courts and the Service. See




246. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9147-007 (Aug. 16, 1991) (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b),
states that "there is no necessity to determine that the Organization actually
competes with other advertisers").
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with taxable entities that might wish to attract corporate
advertising.2 47
The ruling also addresses the question of whether the activity
was regularly carried on. The Service refused to follow the NCAA
decision and ruled that the activity was regularly carried on.248
Publication of the Mobil Cotton Bowl Ruling caused immedi-
ate controversy.249 The Service responded to the furor by issuing
a News Release stating that the corporate sponsorship ruling did
not represent a change in the law.25 ° In the News Release the
Service stated that recognition of a contribution did not result in
unrelated business income. It offered as examples of permissible
forms of recognition a university's naming a professorship, build-
ing, or scholarship after the contributor, a public broadcast sta-
tion's acknowledging a contribution on the air or in its broadcast
schedule, or a performing arts group's acknowledging a contribu-
tor in the program for a performance.251 The News Release also
247. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 states
The Service maintains that the presence of unfair competition is neither
the sole nor the primary criterion to be considered in determining
whether an activity is an unrelated trade or business. However, even if it
were true that there must be a finding of unfair competition, it is
important to recognize the broad reach of the term 'unfair competition.'
For-profit entities that offer * * * and other services might find it is
difficult to compete for the business of the * * * which might otherwise be
inclined to purchase the services of these for-profit entities.
Tech- Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 (Aug. 16, 1991). The Service relied on the American Bar
Endowment case, which is discussed supra at text accompanying notes 109-11.
248. Id. For a discussion of the NCAA decision, see supra at text accompanying
notes 129-36.
249. The Service has described the ensuing events as follows
As soon a TAM 91-47-007 became public, the exempt community erupted
with outrage and concern. Coalitions began forming in an all out effort to
stop this perceived full-scale assault by the IRS on vital fundraising
activities of exempt organizations. Many organizations felt that their
very existence was threatened. The heavily redacted version of the TAM
fueled rather than assuaged their worst fears.
RUSSLYN GuRrmr AND CHARLES BARREr, Corporate Sponsorship Income, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM TEXTBOOK (1992) ("1992 CPE Text") (available elec-
tronically at 94 TNT 70-20).
250. IR-92-4, 1992 IRB Lexis 63 states
Under current law, donations a charitable organization receives are
considered tax exempt contribution income if the organization does not,
in return, provide a valuable benefit or service to the donor. Mere
recognition of a contributor as a benefactor normally is of little or no
value to the donor and is incidental to the contribution.
Unrelated business income is earned by "organizations that go beyond recognition
and extensively promote the donor." Id.
251. News Release IR-92-4.
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stated that "[aissociating the name of the sponsor with the name
of the exempt organization's event is not, by itself, advertising."
25 2
The News Release offered the following noninclusive list of indica-
tors of unrelated business activity:
-providing exposure of the sponsor's name, logo or corpo-
rate message according to negotiated terms of a contract
or other agreement,
-agreeing to verbally or visually maximize donor name or
logo exposure in the media during the sponsored activity,
-linking the amount of payment to the amount of exposure
that the donor's name or logo receives, or
-agreeing that payment is contingent upon the organiza-
tion securing television or other marketing contracts to
provide the sponsor's name widespread exposure. 53
These factors are all consistent with a quid pro quo analysis and
treatment of the corporate sponsorship transaction as an unre-
lated business income transaction.
The Service extended its quid pro quo approach in Announce-
ment 92-15, which set forth Proposed Examination Guidelines
Regarding the Treatment of Corporate Sponsorship Income (the
"Guidelines"). 254 The proposed guidelines emphasized the exist-
ence of a quid pro quo, stating
Payments an exempt organization receives from donors are
nontaxable contributions if there is no expectation that the organ-
ization will provide a substantial return benefit. Mere acknowl-
edgment or recognition of a corporate contributor as a benefactor
normally is incidental to the receipt of a contribution is not of suf-
ficient benefit to give rise to unrelated trade or business income.
However, where an exempt organization performs valuable adver-
tising, marketing, and similar services, on a quid pro quo basis,
for the corporate sponsor, payments made to an exempt organiza-
tion are not contributions to the exempt organization, and ques-
tions of unrelated business income arise.2 55
The Guidelines followed a transactional approach based on a
quid pro quo, stating:
A determination of whether a substantial return benefit is
present should include an analysis of: the value of the ser-
vice provided in exchange for the payment; the terms under
252. News Release IR-92-4.
253. News Release IR-92-4.
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which payments and services are rendered; the amount of
control that the sponsor exercises over the event; and
whether the extent of the organization's exposure of the
donor's name constitutes significant promotion.2"'
The Guidelines then listed factors that might bear on the question
of whether there was a substantial return benefit. With respect to
the corporate sponsor's name or logo, the Guidelines direct atten-
tion to inclusion in the official event title, whether they are "prom-
inently placed throughout the stadium, arena or other site where
the event is held," whether they are displayed on participants'
uniforms, whether they are displayed on materials relating to the
event.257 The Guidelines also direct attention to the corporate
sponsor's reference to its sponsorship in its advertisements, the
possible role of event participants in endorsing the sponsor's prod-
ucts or making personal appearances on behalf of the sponsor, and
such benefits as special seating, accommodations, transportation,
and hospitality for the corporate sponsor's executives or clients.
The Guidelines also raise specific questions about broadcast of the
sponsored event, including whether the payment is contingent on
broadcast giving the sponsor's name or logo widespread exposure,
whether the payment is contingent on television ratings of the
event, whether extensions or renews of the corporate sponsorship
depend on the extent of the public exposure, and "[w]hether the
segment of the public expected to see the identifying sponsorship
information can reasonably be expected to purchase the sponsor's
goods or services."258  These factors are similar to the factors
examined in determining whether the display of a payor's name or
logo in print in an organization's journal constitutes an acknowl-
edgement or an advertisement.259
The Guidelines also provided a form of safe harbor for certain
groups, stating
As a matter of audit tolerance, the Service will not apply
these guidelines to organizations that are of a purely local
nature, that receive relatively insignificant gross revenue
from corporate sponsors and generally operate with signifi-
cant amounts of volunteer labor. Generally, included among




259. See supra at Part V(A)(4).
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baseball and soccer teams, and local theaters and youth
orchestras .
260
While this safe harbor was intended to limit the scope of the
Guideline's application, it may have instead unintentionally
fueled concern among a broad range of organizations that they
would be subject to the corporate sponsorship Guidelines and that
the Guidelines created a new legal standard for distinguishing an
acknowledgement of a contribution from a taxable sale of advertis-
ing and that this new standard would include in taxable advertis-
ing a far greater range of displays previously treated as
acknowledgments. Paradoxically, this result may have been due
in part to the lack of a definition of corporate sponsorship in the
regulations. A definition of corporate sponsorship would have lm-
ited the application of the Guidelines to a knowable range of
transactions, thereby limiting the public concern to those organi-
zations engaging in the defined transaction. While the inclusion
of such a definition seems, from this perspective, prudent, it would
have been inconsistent with the entire logic of the Service's posi-
tion in the Guidelines, which simply apply the Service's interpre-
tation of current law to any transactions that may fit within it.
Presentation of a limiting definition of corporate sponsorship
without specific statutory authority would have resulted in
administrative amendment of current law. In the ensuing debate
over corporate sponsorship, many of the comments read more like
an attack on current law than simply expressions of disagreement
with the corporate sponsorship Guidelines. Opposition to the cor-
porate sponsorship Guidelines became an opportunity to enlarge
the concept of an acknowledgment while limiting the concept of
advertising. This became the heart of the debate, couched in the
extra-statutory term of corporate sponsorship.
The Guidelines announced public hearings would be held and
invited public comments. The Service received over 300 com-
ments, most of which called for fundamental changes in the Ser-
vice's approach.26 ' Comments came from a very diverse group of
260. Id. This safe harbor suggests that the Service did not find such activities
"inherently commercial," perhaps in part because they filfilled most if not all of the
elements of certain exceptions from unrelated business income tax, such as the
volunteer exception- See supra at text accompanying notes 151-52 for a discussion of
the "commerciality" subtext in statutory definition of unrelated business income.
261. 1992 CPE Text supra note 249 states of the public comments
In general, many of the organizations feel that the guidelines are too
broad and vague, and leave too much discretion in the hands of
examiners. Essential terms, such as "substantial return benefits" and
"purely local in nature," need definition. Citing lack of definition, clarity
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exempt organizations, all of which emphasized the importance of
corporate contributions, in whatever form, to their continued oper-
ations. Commentators ranged from the National Collegiate Ath-
letic Association 262 to the Boston Symphony" 3 to the Santa
Barbara Civic Opera264 to the Connecticut Food Bank.26 5
The heart of the substantive comments was an attack on the
transactional approach of the Guidelines. Even though the Guide-
lines stated that the corporate sponsor's treatment of the payment
for federal income tax purposes "is not determinative" of the treat-
ment of the payment by the recipient organization,266 numerous
comments focused on what they saw as the unfairness of looking
at the sponsor's intentions or expectations in determining whether
the recipient organization had unrelated business income from
the sale of advertising. The most consistent expression of this
point of view appears in identical words in the comments of six
college football bowl organizations, which wrote
The proposed guidelines incorrectly focus on the benefit
received by the sponsor. The sponsor's motive is irrelevant.
The IRS should be focusing only on the activities in which
the exempt organization is engaged that would not be per-
formed without the sponsorship funds. Many of the activi-
ties identified in the proposed guidelines are activities an
exempt organization already performs and activities which
further the organization's exempt purpose.267
and scope, few found the audit tolerance provision helpful. The guideline,
it is argued, fail to provide adequate guidance so that an organization
could determine prospectively with reasonable certainty what is
sponsorship recognition and what is advertising. For example, some
commentators express serious concern that identifying product and/or
service lines or slogans are listed as indicators of advertising rather than
donor recognition. Others urge that incidental benefits, such as tickets,
VIP dinners and hospitality suites, given to donors should not taint the
contribution .... All in all, not one provision contained in the proposed
guidelines escaped the ire of commentators, who urged substantial
revisions to, if not complete withdrawal of, the guidelines. While most
accepted that clearly advertising income was taxable, these organizations
also urged a very restrictive definition of what is advertising in the
context of fundraising and donor recognition practices.
262. Comments available at 92 TNT 163-77.
263. Comment available at 92 TNT 163-64.
264. Comment available at 92 TNT 165-103.
265. Comment available at 92 TNT 163-75.
266. Ann. 92-15, 1992-5 I.R.B. 51.
267. Comment by the John Hancock Bowl (92 TNT 163-57); comment by the
Mobil Cotton Bowl Classic (92 TNT 149-70); comment by the Fiesta Bowl (92 TNT
160-46); comment by the Copper Bowl (92 TNT 159-49); comment by the Sugar Bowl
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In the same vein, the Southwest Conference criticized the Guide-
lines for concentrating on "the subjective intent of the donor," but
its subsequent comments indicate that it objected to the focus on
whether the recipient organization provided a benefit to the corpo-
rate sponsor.2 68
This position, of course, ignores the long-established legal
standard based on the organization's provision of a benefit to the
payor,2 69 referring instead simply to the sponsor's motive in mak-
ing the payment and suggesting that the organization provides a
benefit to the sponsor only if it engages in activities that it would
not otherwise undertake. This argument rejects a transactional
analysis of exempt organization operations and suggests instead
that some activities are inherently exempt.
The athletic organizations also argued that the corporate
sponsorship payments should not be subject to the unrelated busi-
ness income tax because the money was used for exempt activi-
ties. They pointed not only to their own exempt activities in
presenting the bowl games or other tournaments, but also to their
support of other exempt organizations, including the universities
participating in the sponsored events and other exempt organiza-
tions in the communities where the events are held. This position
was developed most fully by the NCAA, which commented
Historically, the use of the proceeds from a UBI [unrelated
business income] activity has no relevance on whether the
activity is taxable. Maybe it would be beneficial to see that
(92 TNT 159-50); and comment by the Blue-Gray All Star Football Classic (92 TNT
160-48).
268. Comment of the Southwest Conference (92 TNT 149-46). The comment
expressed concern that the bowl games or other athletic events were being unfairly
singled out and quite correctly observed that acknowledgements in other settings
might also benefit the corporate payor, stating
Some dangerous assumptions are made when delving into the psychology
of giving. It is not at all clear, for example, that attaching the name of a
corporate benefactor to an exempt facility, for example, a building that
plays host to some 250 events per year (a large majority of which are
regularly covered by the media) and, moreover, is readily visible from the
nearby interstate (as the name tastefully yet significantly displayed), is of
any less "commercial" value than the one-day events now in question.
Yet, the proposed guidelines would have you believe otherwise. Likewise,
upon studied consideration of targeted audience demographics and
"appropriate presentation," it is highly likely that acknowledgement of a
corporate underwriter's support in bringing the consumer the fall season
of Masterpiece Theater is as effective a commercial message as a logo
sewn on the side of a football jersey.
Id.
269. See supra at Part III.
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colleges and universities utilize sponsorship income to fund
those sports that are not self supporting such as golf, track,
soccer, tennis, swimming among many others for both men
and women. This income assists in providing opportunities
for men and women who otherwise may not have the avenue
to pursue a college education. At a time when gender equity,
graduation rates, and the poor financial condition of colleges
and universities are at the forefront it would appear that
strong support is needed to protect the revenue stream of
these exempt organizations from taxation. Otherwise, not
only are opportunities lost, but already financially crippled
institutions will be forced to subsidize their athletic pro-
grams. Therefore, a better analysis would be whether the
income is derived as a result of a tax exempt related activity
(i.e., athletic events), and if the revenue is utilized for activi-
ties that are part of the organization's exempt purpose.2 7 0
In effect, the NCAA wishes to add elements of the destination of
income test to the current unrelated business income tax provi-
sions. 1 While there is no reason not to discuss this policy option,
it would constitute a fundamental change in current law by
requiring the repeal of the Section 502 feeder organization provi-
sions as well as of the substantially related test.
The athletic organizations also emphasized that they were
not competing with taxable entities and argued that the absence
of unfair competition meant that the unrelated business income
tax provisions did not apply to them. For example, the Southwest
Conference chided the Service for "abandoning reference to the
competitive impact of the income producing activity of exempt
organizations-upon which the unrelated business income tax is
based-and focusing instead on some visceral and, all too often,
antiquated notion of what a charitable contribution should look
like."27 2 While it is true that there are no direct taxable competi-
tors presenting bowl games, this observation takes a narrow view
of the facts and an unduly expansive view of the importance of
competition as an element in an unrelated business income analy-
sis. It ignores the success of professional sports teams in
attracting corporate sponsorship273 and fails to appreciate that
current law does not make competition with taxable entities an
270. Comment of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (92 TNT 163-77).
271. See Hill and Kirschten supra note 17 at 10.01[1] for a discussion of the
destination of income test.
272. Comment of the Southwest Conference (92 TNT 149-46).
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independent element of the definition of an unrelated trade or
business.27 4 The Ladies Professional Golf Association ("LPGA7)
asked the Service to clarify the volunteer exception in the context
of LPGA tournaments.27
Numerous arts and cultural organizations also commented
adversely on the Guidelines. Generally, the arts organizations
sought clarification of the line between acknowledgements and
advertising but did not reject the quid pro quo analysis as incon-
sistent with current law. Many of the arts organizations, using
essentially similar language, took the position that
[tihe guidelines should make a clear distinction between
sponsorship recognition which merely provides an indirect
benefit to the sponsor in the nature of goodwill or other
intangible benefits and recognition designed to promote
actively a specific service or product of the sponsor in a man-
ner similar to commercially available advertising.2 76
Several organizations devoted to research on particular dis-
eases also expressed concern that the Guidelines would limit the
use of fund raising events to support research. The American
Heart Association ("AHA") stated that "a small but significant por-
tion of out total revenues is derived from corporate sponsorships"
and expressed a general concern about the consequences to
research on heart disease if it were taxed on these corporate pay-
ments.277 The AHA rejected a quid pro quo analysis and called
instead called for "a test that focuses on the essential nature of a
sponsorship communication." 278  The proposed test would be
based on such factors as whether the message benefitted the cor-
274. See supra at text accompanying note 115.
275. Comment of Ladies Professional Golf Association (92 TNT 163-62)
(comment prepared by former Internal Revenue Service Commissioner Donald C.
Alexander).
276. Comments of the Boston Symphony Orchestra on proposed audit guidelines
(available electronically at 92 TNT 163-64). For a discussion of print advertising, see
supra at Part V(A)(4).
277. Comment available at 92 TNT 116-60.
278. Id. Asserting that corporate payers should be expected to seek a benefit in
return for their payments, the AHA stated
By their very nature, corporate activities are expected to yield substantial
return benefits. It is, in fact, this characteristic that distinguishes
corporations from not-for-profit organizations. To impose a new tax
burden on the nonprofit community simply because corporate donors
derive some benefit from their contributions serves merely to punish the
nonprofit community for tapping into the natural inclinations of another
community. Id.
This comment rejects any examination of what an exempt organization in fact pro-
vides, and thus, rejects a transactional analysis of exempt organizations' operations.
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porate sponsor or the exempt organization, whether the target
audience is potential customers of the corporate sponsor or poten-
tial participants in or supporters of the exempt organization, or
whether the exempt organization or the corporate sponsor con-
trolled the delivery of the message.279 While these factors might
be considered under current law in distinguishing advertising
from an acknowledgement, this approach seeks to minimize atten-
tion to the benefits the exempt organization provides to the corpo-
rate sponsor.
Several civic organizations also submitted comments. The
Buffalo Common Council passed an ordinance opposing the Guide-
lines.28 0 These comments generally focused on the adverse impact
on local economies predicted to follow the chill to corporate giving
thought to arise from the Guidelines.28 1
Comments from such a diverse array of exempt organizations
effectively alerted the Service to the extent of the disaffection with
the Guidelines even though many of the comments demonstrated
a lack of understanding of current law or of the Guidelines.28 2
These comments played a crucial role in the total lobbying effort
by creating a climate of disaffection among those most directly
affected by the Guidelines. Stated more precisely, the mobiliza-
tion of a large number of very diverse organizations helped mask
the nature of the interests directly at issue while creating a cli-
mate of concern and opposition.
The final element in the lobbying effort was to offer the Ser-
vice a technical solution to the corporate sponsorship issue. Both
the American Bar Association Section of Taxation Committee on
279. Id.
280. Comment of the City of Buffalo on proposed audit guidelines (available
electronically at 92 TNT 116-63). The ordinance stated
This Common council is opposed to any IRS regulation that inhibits
corporate donations to not-for-profit organizations that provide funding
for cultural events that might otherwise not be offered to the community
and requests that some latitude be given that would allow the corporate
donors name on signage and any other form of advertising used to
promote the event.
Id.
281. See, e.g., the comment on the proposed audit guidelines of the International
Association of Auditorium Managers (available electronically at 92 TNT 126-110),
which suggested that the financial viability of some 800 public assembly facilities in
the United States depended on permitting displays of the names and logos of
corporate sponsors at sponsored events.
282. Many of the comments in effect called for a fundamental reform of the
unrelated business income tax that would virtually eliminate tax on the trade or
business activities of exempt organizations by broadening the not regularly carried on
exemption and eliminating the substantially related test.
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Exempt Organizations (the "ABA Committee) 2 3 and Independ-
ent Sector,28 4 an umbrella organization of exempt organizations,
presented solutions that contained common elements but with
important differences in approach. Both of these organizations
accepted the quid pro quo analysis at the heart of current law but
each sought to redefine it in fundamental ways.
The ABA Committee's approach rested on an attempt to rede-
fine the concept of a benefit that should be taken into account in a
quid pro quo analysis, asserting that "recognition benefits" should
not be considered a substantial benefit but that "return benefits"
should be considered a substantial benefit. This distinction did
not rest on the relative value of either type of benefit but on the
nature of the benefit. Following Justice O'Connor's reasoning in
her dissent in Hernandez,8 5 the ABA Committee analogized what
it called "recognition benefits" to religious benefits, neither of
which should be taken into account. The basis for this analogy
remained unspecified in the absence of any analogue to the Con-
stitutional protections provided religion. The analogy seemed to
rest on assertions regarding customary practices of exempt orga-
nizations, with references to the legal basis of acknowledgements.
Applied to corporation sponsorship arrangements, the concept of a
"recognition benefit" permitted the ABA Committee to offer the
following analysis
The essential feature of a corporate sponsorship arrange-
ment is the charity's agreement to provide to the sponsor in
exchange for the contribution some kind of public association
with a charitable program or event. Although the manner in
which the association is announced or established will vary
from one sponsorship arrangement to another, what is char-
acteristic of contributions in the sponsorship context is that
they are made with the expectation of a benefit that is
important to the sponsor.
We think it important the Examination Guidelines
explicitly recognize that contribution treatment does not
depend on a finding that the benefit derived by a corporate
sponsor is in any quantitative sense "incidental" or "insub-
stantial." The benefit that is provided is typically signifi-
cant' it is typically negotiated for' and it is sometimes of
283. Comment of the American Bar Association Section of Taxation Committee
on Exempt Organizations ('1992 ABA Comment") (available electronically at 92 TNT
151-37).
284. Comment of Independent Sector on proposed audit guidelines ("1992
Independent Sector Comment") (available electronically at 92 TNT 160-53).
285. See supra at text accompanying note 69.
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quite substantial public relations value. What distinguishes
a contribution from a receipt in the sponsorship context is
that the benefit received in exchange for a sponsorship con-
tribution is a benefit of a nature or in a category that the tax
law has traditionally accepted as consistent with the contri-
bution definition-typically, in the case of a sponsorship con-
tribution, the category of Recognition Benefits.2 8
To make the category of "recognition benefits" serve its ends,
the ABA Committee attempted to separate the Duberstein stan-
dard of "disinterested generosity" which the Supreme Court
applied in Hernandez from the operative standard for a deductible
charitable contribution under Section 170.287 This position is nec-
essary to detach the concept of "recognition benefit" from a value
test. Then, the ABA Committee confronted the question of the
form that permissible recognition might take. Here, the ABA
Committee argued that "acknowledgement formalities" should be
treated as "recognition benefits" rather than as "return benefits."
These "acknowledgement formalities" were described as "some
occasion for an event or ceremony or for some set of courtesies that
will serve to express in a public way the charity's gratitude for the
sponsor's support."288 The ABA Committee offered examples of a
reception at a museum or a dinner in honor of a contributor who
endowed a university chair or a special concert for the sponsor of a
symphony series, and concluded that "[wihat distinguishes an
Acknowledgement Formality from a Return Benefit is that an
Acknowledgement Formality fits in the tradition of ceremonies or
events honoring major donors to charity, and that it is propor-
tional to the gift received."2 9 The ABA Committee also urged
that "in the specific context of an event arranged by an exempt
organization to honor a major corporate sponsor, there need be no
limit on the extent to which the business of the sponsor is empha-
sized" because an Acknowledgement Formality "is by definition
286. 1992 ABA Comment.
287. Id. This argument was bolstered by suggestions that corporate
contributors could not make charitable contributions based on disinterested
generosity. If this were an accurate statement of current law, which it is not, it would
not explain why a corporate contributor would be compelled by its duty to its
shareholders to receive in exchange a benefit in the nature of advertising rather than
a benefit in the nature of goodwill that is consistent with current law concepts of
acknowledgements. See Knauer, supra note 2 for a discussion of corporate law issues.
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not a public event."290 The ABA Committee did not, however,
limit reference to a corporate sponsor's business or products to
such private events, but urged that "references to products and
product lines for purposes of sponsor identification may be consis-
tent with treatment of the benefit as a Recognition Benefit."291
The ABA Committee would treat as a Return Benefit only ref-
erences to the corporate sponsor's product or product line that con-
stituted "actual product promotion."292 Thus, according to the
ABA Committee the recipient organization of a corporate sponsor-
ship payment would be treated as having sold advertising only if
the message contained information on price or product availability
or "any detailed description or any explicit evaluation of the spon-
sor's products, or any comparison to competing products."
2 93
While the ABA Committee argued that linking the corporate spon-
sorship payment to arrangements for media exposure, including
television coverage, was consistent with treatment as an Acknowl-
edgement Benefit, it suggested that tying the payment to ratings
might indicate that the corporate sponsorship arrangement con-
stituted advertising.294 However, the ABA Committee also sug-
gested that in some cases constant repetition of the corporate
sponsor's name could produce a "saturation effect" that consti-
tuted advertising.
295
The ABA Committee provided the Service one way of appear-
ing to maintain its transactional approach while so redefining it
that most corporate sponsorship arrangements would not be taxa-
ble to the recipient organizations. The analytical weakness was




293. Id. Under this approach much of the advertising on television and in the
print media would not be treated as advertising.
294. Id.
295. Id. The comment states
The most troublesome question in the application of the Return Benefit
analysis involves what in a few cases is a kind of saturation effect. Even
if a charity avoids product promotion or any of the other obvious elements
of normal advertising in connection with a sponsored event, we believe
that the Examination Guidelines must recognize that there can be cases
in which the charity so repeatedly, obviously, and visibly emphasizes the
sponsor's association with the sponsored event that even if none of the
usual Return Benefit factors are present, the pure saturation effect is so
great that the event as a whole should emphasize that these cases are
likely to be rare, and that in most situations the agent should focus on the
kind of analysis described above.
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from current law, namely, the attempt to argue that the extent of
the benefit to the corporate sponsor had no legal significance.
Independent Sector, in comments prepared by a leading
Washington, D.C. law firm, provided a more subtle approach that
also both accepted and redefined a quid pro quo analysis.29 6 This
approach shifted attention from the benefit provided by the recipi-
ent of a corporate sponsorship payment and looked instead at the
activities performed by the recipient organization. Based on this
approach, Independent Sector urged the Service to include the fol-
lowing statement in revised Guidelines on corporate sponsorship
Contributors to charities frequently make their gifts because
of a desire for the public recognition and improved reputa-
tion though to accompany such gifts. In particular, busi-
nesses normally make charitable contributions only where
they conclude that doing so will serve a business purpose,
including improved community standing and public aware-
ness of the business that will flow from publicity concerning
the gift. Such benefits may be of considerable commercial
value. It is fully consistent with a true gift that the business
donor is motivated primarily by desire for the reputational
and image benefits to the business that will flow from the
gift, or that the donee, in soliciting a gift, stresses such bene-
fits. What distinguishes advertising from recognition is not
motive, or consciousness of business benefit, but provision by
the organization receiving the payment of advertising serv-
ices in exchange for the payment. Only where the donee
goes beyond normal identification and recognition of donors
and provides advertising, marketing, or similar services are
the amounts received potentially unrelated business income
rather than contributions.297
This approach draws on the language of a royalty analysis, which
turns on whether the organization provided the kind of services
that are inconsistent with a pure licensing agreement, to redefine
the trade or business definition based on a profit motive, not on
the nature or extent of activities. Thus, Independent Sector draws
on the language of a modification of the definition of a trade or
business to take many if not most corporate sponsorship arrange-
ment out of the definition of an unrelated trade or business. How-
ever, this approach also depends upon shifting the analysis from
the exempt organization's solicitation of corporate sponsorship
payments to the nature of activities the organization must under-
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take to provide these benefits. 298 The Independent Sector com-
ment characterized these activities by listing factors indicating
that the organization was simply acknowledging a contribution,
neutral factors, and factors tending to indicate that the organiza-
tion was providing advertising services. The following factors sup-
port characterization as an acknowledgement: publicity is directed
primarily at audiences chosen for reasons related to the recipient
organization's exempt purposes; the payment exceeds the cost of
equivalent advertising; the sponsor agrees to publicize the recipi-
ent organization's exempt activities; there are multiple business
sponsors; satisfying Federal Communication standards applied to
the ban on advertising on public radio and television stations.
Independent Sector identifies the following as neutral factors:
written agreements; participation by outside professional advi-
sors; exclusive sponsorships; termination for breach; likelihood
that the segment of the public likely to see the sponsorship infor-
mation will patronize the sponsor; use of sponsor logos; identifica-
tion of the sponsor on uniforms; use of sponsor name or logo on
material relating to the event; provision of sponsor products as
prizes or premiums and their identification as having been given
by the sponsor; assurances that the recipient organization will
acknowledge the sponsor's support in its communications with its
members and supporter; and "brief identifying references to prod-
ucts or services, or use of a sponsor slogan."29 9 The following fac-
tors indicate advertising: requiring personnel of the recipient
organization or participants in the organization's events to par-
ticipate in selling the sponsor's products; "descriptions of sponsor
products or service beyond brief listings appropriate for identifica-
298. Id. This subtle, but essential, shift parallels the shift in the NCAA case
from the time during which the NCAA solicited advertising to the time during which
the program in which the advertising appeared was sold during the tournament. See
supra at text accompanying notes 129-36 for a discussion of this case.
299. Id. In language similar to that used by the ABA Committee in taking the
same position, the Independent Sector comment stated
The proposed guidelines make any reference to sponsor products or
services in the acknowledgement an indicator or advertising. Sec.
178.3(3)(c)2. While it is appropriate to treat extensive descriptions of
products or services as such an indicator, this blanket rule goes too far.
Corporate sponsors have a legitimate interest in being recognized for
their generosity, and, in many cases, meaningful recognition requires
some brief description of the business, products, or services. Such
identifying material does not suffice to transform an acknowledgement
into advertising. Moreover, a strict rule against slogans or product
descriptions would discriminate against businesses whose name are not
particularly descriptive or well known.
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tion"; references to prices, sales, or comparison to competitor prod-
ucts; and making the amount of the corporate sponsorship
payment contingent on securing media coverage.300 By directing
attention to the activities of the recipient organization, the
Independent Sector comment avoided the ABA Committee's prob-
lem of directly defending return benefits of substantial value.
While the two positions are essentially similar, Independent Sec-
tor avoided the difficult task of redefining a charitable contribu-
tion and chose instead to attempt to redefine a trade or business.
A third approach was taken by the public broadcast stations,
which argued forcefully that the Federal Communications Com-
mission ("FCC") standard for compliance with the advertising ban
should apply. This approach shifted the debate from the Code to
what could be made to appear to be largely a procedural issue of
coordinating the Code with other applicable law. Response to the
Guidelines by exempt organizations demonstrated the classic lob-
bying technique of putting forward the more sympathetic groups
rather than those at the heart of the controversy who may account
for the greatest amount of foregone revenue. These are classic lob-
bying techniques because they tend to be successful, and this case
was no exception. However, the success at the regulatory level
derived in substantial part from success on the legislative front.
VII. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY EFFORTS TO DEFINE A
SPECIAL RULE FOR CORPORATE SPONSORSHIP
A The Congressional Response
At the same time that the Service was issuing nonpreceden-
tial guidance treating corporate sponsorship payments as unre-
lated business income, Congress passed legislation that would
have created a statutory exception for most corporate sponsorship
arrangements. 30 1 The legislation would have added a new subsec-
tion (i) to section 513, the section of the Code containing the other
narrowly-targeted statutory exceptions to the general statutory
definitions of unrelated business income.30 2 This legislation pro-
vided an exception from the unrelated business income tax for
"qualified sponsorship payments" that are received in connection
300. Id.
301. Sec. 7303 of the Revenue Act of 1992, H.R. 11, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
302. See supra at Part V(B)(2) for a discussion of these statutory exceptions.
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with a "qualified public event." 3 ' A qualified public event was an
event conducted by certain types of exempt organizations 30 4 that
satisfied one of two tests. First, a qualified public event was any
"public event the conduct of which is substantially related (aside
from the need of the organization for income or funds or the use it
makes of the profits derived) to the exempt purposes of the organi-
zation conducting such event."30 5 Second, a public entertainment
event is any event that does not satisfy the first test provided that
"such event is the only event of that type conducted by such organ-
ization during a calendar year and such event does not exceed 30
consecutive days."
30 6
This approach is consistent with Congressional enactment of
the statutory modifications and exceptions discussed above.3 0 7
There can be no question that Congress was acting within its
proper authority. It is not a particularly telling critique of such
special rules simply to point out that they alter the result arrived
at by applying the general principles. That is, after all, the reason
for enacting special rules. Showing that certain members of Con-
gress or of the tax-writing committees are football fans intent on
protecting home-state bowl games is largely irrelevant without a
theory of why this approach is inconsistent with a legitimate con-
cept of representation.30 8 Some critics opposed the legislation not
on tax grounds but on the grounds of its implications for college
athletics, seeing the non-taxation of corporate sponsorship pay-
ments as contributing to an undesirable commercialization of col-
303. The language and the structure of this exception are akin to the language
and structure of the exceptions for public entertainment events and trade show
activities. See supra at text accompanying notes 222-24.
304. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), (4), (5), (6) organizations and those state colleges or
universities described in I.R.C. § 511(a)(2)(B) that perform activities consistent with
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) purposes. The subsection as enacted granted the Service specific
regulatory authority to ensure that these limitations on permissible recipients of
nontaxable payments would not be circumvented by the use of complex structures of
related organizations. For an analysis of complex structures, see Hill and Kirschten
supra note 17 at Chapter 9.
305. Sec. 7303 of H.R. 11. The language rejects a destination of income rationale
evoke by several of the comments on the Guidelines. See supra at Part VI.
306. Id. The subsection as enacted did not define what was meant by an event
"of that type." Id. A restrictive meaning would have treated all public events as one
category.
307. See supra at Part V.B.
308. Paul Streckfus, IRs's Pre-Inaugural Gift for Charities, 7 ExEMPT ORG. TAX
Rav. 179 (1993) refers to the remarks of an lawyer who observed that the Cotton Bowl
would never be taxable, as long as there were Texans on the House of Representatives
Ways and Means Committee, the tax-writing committee of the House.
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lege sports.30 9 The most surprising critic of the proposed
legislation was the Service, which took the position that Congress
was protecting only the college football games and not other
exempt organizations. 10 In effect, the Service asserted that Con-
gress was not protecting the public interest and was transgressing
the norms of fairness that are generally thought to be fundamen-
tal criteria of appropriate tax policy.
311
A more meaningful critique would show that a particular spe-
cial rule or a structure of special rules undermines the purposes of
the statute. This is not the same as showing that it simply pro-
duces a different result. In the context of tax legislation this cri-
tique requires a showing that the fairness and efficiency and
simplicity of the statute have been undermined by the special
rules. None of the critics of Congress and the subsequent Service
position have attempted to do this. Indeed, it is possible to argue
that narrowly targeted special rules that resolve special cases that
become, for whatever reason, points of policy contention, preserve
the integrity of the statute. If the general principles apply to most
309. See the remarks of Rep. Michael A. Andrews (D-Tex.), who argued that the
college bowl games have changed over the past decade and have "gone way beyond
any bounds of what is appropriate for education." 138 Cong. Rec. H 6638 (July 27,
1992).
310. See James J. McGovern, Service's McGovern Explains Proposed Corporate
Sponsorship Regulations, 58 Tax Notes 795 (Feb. 8, 1993). See also, Gioia Ligos and
Russlyn Guritz, Corporate Sponsorship Income, 1993 CPE Text (available
electronically at 94 TNT 71-50). While this critique fairly applied to certain earlier
legislative proposals, it did not apply to H.R. 11, which incorporated the language of
H.R. 5645. For the comments of Rep. Ed Jenkins (D-Ga.), one of the sponsors of H.R.
5645, on the decision to broaden earlier bills to encompass most exempt
organizations, see 138 Cong. Rec. H 6636-37 (July 27, 1992).
311. Rep. Beryl Anthony (D-Ark) rejected this assertion by the Service,
asserting: "As members of Congress it is our duty to define the law and determine how
it will impact our constituents." 138 Cong. Rec. H6639 (July 27, 1992). Some critics
of the Service's subsequent change in position argued that the Service had ignored the
public interest and had itself been captured by special interests. See, Paul Streckfus,
IRs' Pre-Inaugural Gift for Charities, 58 Tax Notes 384 (Jan. 25, 1993); Lee A.
Sheppard, The Goldberg Variations, or Giving Away the Store, 58 Tax Notes 530 (Feb.
1, 1993); Paul Streckfus, Corporate Sponsorship Sellout Puts IRS At Risk, 60 Tax
Notes 1641 (Sept. 20, 1993). These critiques of both the substance of the proposed
regulations and the process by which they were produced elicited thoughtful letters to
Tax Notes regarding the proper roles of Congress and the Service in formulating tax
policy. See, Milton Cerny, Sheppard Variations, 58 Tax Notes 981 (Feb. 15,
1993)(defending the role played by the Service and Treasury during the corporate
sponsorship debates); James P. Holden, Lee Sheppard's Grumpy Attack, 58 Tax Notes
1130 (Feb. 22, 1993)(defending the integrity of the Service but also suggesting
broader role for Congress); George Yin, The Tax Administrator's Duty To Take Pro-
Government Positions, 58 Tax Notes 1387 (March 8, 1993)(snggesting that Congress
relies on private interests or Treasury to initiate tax legislation and may not
effectively play the role Holden suggests).
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cases in a manner that is fair and efficient and simple, then spe-
cial exceptions provide a necessary element of anti-structure.
312
This legislation was part of a larger tax package that was
pocket vetoed by President Bush in November 1992. However,
Congress had signalled its intentions with respect to corporate
sponsorship of college football bowl games. This legislative victory
strengthened the interests that were also lobbying the Service,
which subsequently issued proposed regulations attempting to
find a statutory basis under current law for regulations permitting
corporate sponsorship payments to be excluded from the recipient
organization's unrelated business income. 13 This task is far more
problematic for a regulatory agency that must find a basis for the
revised position in current law than it is for a legislative body that
is not required to provide a basis in current law for its current
enactments.
Despite these considerations, the organizations interested in
changing the Service's treatment of corporate sponsorship income
preferred a regulatory solution. In contrast to a legislative
change, a regulatory solution did not come at the price of an off-
setting revenue-raising provision. 14
B. The Service's Revised Position on Corporate Sponsorship
In January 1993 the Service issued proposed regulations that
dramatically modified its prior position.3 1 5 The Service aban-
doned a quid pro quo transactional analysis.3 1 6 Instead, the pro-
posed regulations rest on a distinction between an
acknowledgement, which does not result in taxation, and advertis-
ing, which does subject the recipient to taxation. In presenting
these definitions, the Service placed primary emphasis on the
nature of the activity and de-emphasized the benefit provided by
the recipient organization to the corporate sponsor. While the
proposed regulations appeared under Section 513, it is far from
clear what statutory provision or provisions they are referencing
and applying and, thus, what constitutes the statutory basis for
312. VICTOR TURNER, THE RrrUAL PROCESS: STRUCTURE A ANTI-STRuCTURE
(1969). ROBERT B. EDGERTON, RULES, ExcErTioNs, N SocIAL ORDER (1985).
313. See infra at Part VII(B).
314. The Budget Act required that all revenue-losing provisions be offset by
revenue-raising provisions. The trade-off in the case of corporate sponsorship was
income from affinity credit cards. See supra note 11.
315. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4, 58 Fed. Reg. 5,687 (Jan. 22, 1993).
316. 1993 CPE Text supra note 310 states: 'The test is not, as was suggested in
the guidelines and the earlier rulings, whether there is a quid pro quo. Rather, the
test is whether there is advertising or acknowledgement."
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the position taken. 17 The preamble to the proposed regulations
states that they "take into consideration both an exempt organiza-
tion's need to attract private sector support and the statutory and
regulatory requirement that the organization be organized and
operated exclusively for exempt purposes."318
The proposed regulations define advertising as
any message or other programming material which is broad-
cast or otherwise transmitted, published, displayed or dis-
tributed in exchange for any remuneration, and which
promotes or markets any company, service, facility or prod-
uct. Advertising includes any activity which promotes or
markets any company, service, facility or product.31 9
Advertising does not include "acknowledgments,"3 2 ° which the
proposed regulations define as follows:
Acknowledgments are mere recognition of sponsorship pay-
ments. Acknowledgments may include the following, pro-
vided that the effect is identification of the sponsor rather
than promotion of the sponsor's products, services, or facili-
ties; sponsor logos and slogans that do not contain compara-
tive or qualitative descriptions of the sponsor's products,
services, facilities or company; sponsor locations and tele-
phone numbers; value-neutral descriptions, including dis-
plays or visual depictions, of a sponsor's product-line or
services; and sponsor brand or trade names and product or
service listings. Logos or slogans that are an established
part of a sponsor's identity are not considered to contain
comparative or qualitative descriptions.
321
317. The Preamble to the proposed regulations states that "[tio the extent
possible, the proposed regulations are designed to parallel the statutory and
regulatory framework of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) currently in
effect." 58 Fed. Reg. 5687, 5688 (Jan. 22, 1993). The Preamble cites In the Matter of
Commission Policy Concerning the Noncommercial Nature of Educational
Broadcasting Stations, Public Notice FCC 86-16 (April 11, 1986). The Service states
in the Preamble to the proposed regulations that "this should not be viewed as ceding,
in any way, the Service's authority to interpret and administer the Internal Revenue
Code." 58 Fed. Reg. 5687, 5688 (Jan. 22, 1993).
318. 58 Fed. Reg. 5687, 5688 (January 22, 1993).
319. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(b).
320. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(b).
321. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(1). In its comments on the proposed
regulations, the American Bar Association Section of Taxation Committee on Exempt
Organizations ("1993 ABA Comments")(available electronically at 93 TNT 144-19)
expressed concern that reference to whether "the effect is identification of the sponsor
rather than promotion of the sponsor's products, services, or facilities" would require
a factual inquiry as to effects and suggested that the language be changed to refer to
whether the purpose was identification of the sponsor or promotion of its products.
The comment was silent as to how purpose, or intent, was to be determined.
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These general definitions are illustrated with several exam-
ples. Displaying the latest model automobiles produced by the
corporate sponsor in the tournament area does not result in adver-
tising treatment.322 Permitting restaurants that are corporate
sponsors of an arts festival to sell food at the festival or to dis-
tribute samples of their food does not make the restaurants' pay-
ments advertising income to the organization presenting the
festival.323 Changing the name of an event to include the name of
a corporate sponsor does not result in advertising treatment.324
Displays of the corporate sponsor's name and logo are approved in
several examples. 325 The statutory or empirical bases of these
examples remain obscure. The Service itself remarked in the Pre-
amble to the proposed regulations
The principle of administrative simplicity governs the rules
defining advertising and acknowledgements in the proposed
regulations. As a result, the lines drawn between activities
constituting advertising and acknowledgements may not
relate to the substance of the activities. For example, distri-
bution of samples of a sponsor's product to the general public
at a sponsored event is advertising. However, the proposed
regulations provide that distribution of samples of a spon-
sor's product constitutes an acknowledgement rather than
advertising.
326
The proposed regulations include a 'tainting rule' providing
that "[i]f any activities, messages, or programming material con-
stitute advertising with respect to a sponsorship payment, then all
related activities, messages or programming material that might
otherwise be acknowledgments are considered advertising."
3 21
322. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(g), Example 3.
323. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(g), Example 6. The example does not indicate
whether the samples were free, but there is also no basis for treating sales differently
than free samples under the proposed regulations. Id.
324. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(g), Example 1.
325. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(g), Example 1 (name of corporate sponsor of
walkathon and marathon in promotional fliers, newspaper advertisements, and on T-
shirts worn by participants); Example 2 (name of corporate sponsor of art exhibition
displayed in all publicity materials, including banners, poster, brochures, and public
service announcements); Example 3 (name and logo of corporate sponsor of sports
tournament displayed on signs, scoreboards, and other printed material); Example 4
(name and logo of corporate sponsor of college football bowl game displayed on playing
field, players' helmets and uniforms, scoreboard and stadium signs, on cups for soft
drinks at the game, and "on all related printed material distributed in connection
with the game"); and Example 5 (corporate sponsor that underwrites the expenses of
a team has its name and logo on team uniforms). Id.
326. 58 Fed. Reg. 5686, 5688 (January 22, 1993).
327. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2).
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Such tainting elements include "qualitative or comparative lan-
guage; price information or other indications of savings or value
associated with a product or service; a call to action; an endorse-
ment; or an inducement to buy, sell, rent or lease the sponsor's
product or service."
328
The proposed regulations treat the existence of a contract or
the degree of detail are neutral factors.3 29 Exclusivity of a spon-
sorship arrangement does not in itself mean that the payment is
advertising income. 330 Similarly, providing benefits such as com-
plimentary tickets to the sponsor or to individuals designated by
the sponsor are not relevant in determining whether the sponsor-
ship payment is advertising income.331 The sponsorship payment
may be contingent on the event's taking place or being broadcast
without resulting in treating the payment as advertising income,
but "[w]here the amount of the sponsorship payment is contin-
328. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2). The regulations provides that
"[distribution of a sponsor's product by the sponsor or the exempt organization to the
general public at the sponsored event, whether for free or for remuneration, is not
considered an inducement to buy, sell, rent or lease the sponsor's product for purposes
of this regulation." The only example of a message that constitutes advertising and
not an endorsement is Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(g), Example 7, in which a
noncommercial radio station broadcast the following message: "This program has
been underwritten by the Record Shop, where you can find all of your great hit music.
The record shop is located at 123 Main Street. Give them a call today at 555-1234.
This station is proud to have the Record Shop as a sponsor." While the example does
not provide any guidance on the specific reasons for treating this message as
advertising, giving the address and telephone number seems to constitute a call to
action.
329. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(d). The proposed regulations state: "The mere
existence of a sponsorship contract does not necessarily mean that a sponsorship
payment is income from advertising. The terms of the agreement, not its existence or
degree of detail, are relevant to the determination." Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.513-4(g),
Example 4 presents a "detailed contract" treated as an acknowledgement, not
advertising.
330. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(d). Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(g), Example 4
treats an exclusive sponsorship arrangement as not advertising.
331. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4() states that
[pirovision of facilities, services or other privileges by an exempt
organization to the sponsor or individuals designated by the sponsor (e.g.,
complimentary tickets, pro-am playing spots in golf tournaments or
receptions for major donors) in connection with the sponsorship payment
does not affect the determination of whether a sponsorship payment is
advertising income.
In Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(g), Example 2 the corporate sponsor of an exhibition at
a museum receives a special tour of the exhibition for its employees and the museum
hosts a special dinner for the corporate sponsor's executives without jeopardizing
acknowledgment characterization. Similarly, in Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(g), Exam-
ple 3, the corporate sponsor receives admissions passes and pro-am playing spots but
the payment is not advertising income to the recipient organization.
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gent, by contract or otherwise, upon factors such as attendance at
an event or broadcast ratings, the sponsorship payment is consid-
ered advertising income."332
In addition to limiting the circumstances under which corpo-
rate sponsorship payment might be subject to the unrelated busi-
ness income tax, the proposed regulations also limited the amount
of any such income that might be taxable by treating corporate
sponsorship as an activity that exploits an exempt function.3 3
Thus, expenses associated with the exempt function in excess of
the cost of the exempt function can be deducted from the corporate
sponsorship payment and the amount of unrelated business taxa-
ble income decreased.
334
The proposed regulations were generally well-received by the
policy-shaping community of exempt organizations and their pro-
fessional advisors. 33 5 Instead of a broad-based mobilization of
local organizations to create a political climate of opposition, sev-
eral national policy-shaping organizations addressed particular
issues in the proposed regulations, but in a general climate of sup-
port for the Service, and used the occasion of the public comment
period and public hearings to attempt to use the positions taken in
the proposed regulations to modify the general principles of the
unrelated business income tax on other fronts. These leading pol-
icy-shapers were seeking to consolidate one lobbying victory and
lay the foundation for others.
The 'tainting rule' occasioned the most consistent criticism.
Most comments called for application of the principles of Revenue
Ruling 67-246, which treats any amount in excess of the fair mar-
ket value of the benefit received as a charitable contribution. 36
332. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(e). See also, Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(g),
Example 4.
333. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-1(e), Examples (2)-(4).
334. It is less certain that this computational benefit addresses potential
jeopardy to the organization's exempt status because the Service has never clarified
whether the commensurate in scope test is based on net unrelated business taxable
income or gross unrelated business income or to what extent, if any, the amount of
activity is balanced against the amount of income. See supra at Part V.C.
335. See 1993 ABA Comment. See also the unofficial transcript of the Hearings
on the Proposed Regulations on Corporate Sponsorship (available electronically at 93
TNT 147-33).
336. See, e.g., 1993 ABA Comment (93 TNT 144-19); Comment of National
Public Radio and Public Television Stations (93 TNT 138-26); Comment of
Independent Sector calling for a de minimi rule (93 TNT 134-24); National Society of
Fund Raising Executives (93 TNT 138-25); Comment of PGA Tour, Inc. (93 TNT 151-
20 calling for no tainting with respect to elements in separate contracts); Comment of
American Heart Association calling for respect of separate contracts or allocations in
a contract as protection against tainting rule (93 TNT 139-47); Comment of American
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Several comments urged that the tainting rule be replaced with
its obverse, thereby permitting favorable treatment as corporate
sponsorship to apply to numerous "ancillary activities" such as
advertising in game programs.337 This position provides a signifi-
cant illustration of the use of the proposed regulations on corpo-
rate sponsor to liberalize current law. The comment of the public
broadcasters illustrates the technique. 338  Noting that the pro-
posed regulations do not define corporate sponsorship, the public
broadcasters stated
Since the purpose of the Proposed Regulations is to provide
clarity and certainty, it is important to address any signifi-
cant ambiguities that remain. However, in many cases,
sponsorship arrangements cover not just a single event but
multiple events and ancillary activities related to them. We
are concerned that hinging the application of the regulations
on the existence of a "sponsored event" may be unduly
restrictive, unless the term is defined broadly to encompass
the entire sponsorship arrangement, and not just a particu-
lar event or activity.
For example, in public broadcasting, it is common for a
corporate underwriting arrangement to cover not only fund-
ing for a particular program or series, but also the cost of
advertising the program or series in the station's magazines,
or a variety of other media. The underwriter may also pro-
vide funding for publications, educational guides and other
activities that are extensions of the program or series. If a
definition of "sponsored event" is added to the Proposed Reg-
ulations, it should be broad enough to encompass all ancil-
lary and related activities that are part of the sponsorship
arrangement, including (but not limited to) advertisements
Association of Museums (93 TNT 134-25); Comment of Football Bowl Association (93
TNT 133-34); Comment of American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (93
TNT 146-35); Comment of Coopers & Lybrand (93 TNT 147-24). At the Hearings on
the proposed regulations, the spokesman for the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants commented that the tainting rule was inconsistent with the
fragmentation rule (93 TNT 147-23).
337. 1993 ABA Comment (93 TNT 144-19); Comment of National Public Radio
and Public Television Stations (93 TNT 138-26). At the Hearings on the proposed
regulations the United States Olympic Committee noted that "corporate sponsorship
agreements often provide a package of benefits to the sponsor" and requested further
guidance on the circumstances under which these benefits would be treated as related
(93 TNT 147-23).
338. Comment of National Public Radio and America's Public Television
Stations (93 TNT 138-26).
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in station guides or publications, publicity campaigns and
ancillary educational activities and programs.339
This comment artfully raises three related issues-ancillary
activities, print advertising, and the regularly carried on require-
ment. Treating the proposed regulations as a baseline, the com-
ment addresses the issue of ancillary activities and lays the
foundation for subsequent efforts to liberalize the treatment of
print advertising in periodicals and the regularly carried on
requirement.340 The ABA Comment follows the same strategy by
seeking to move forward on ancillary activities while raising ques-
tions with respect to print advertising in periodicals and the regu-
larly carried on requirement. 341  Arguing that a distinction
between displays that are treated as acknowledgements under the
proposed regulations and displays in the event program "would be
arbitrary and inappropriate," the ABA Comment urges that "the
term 'corporate sponsorship' should be defined so as to include
payments made with respect to programs, catalogs, or other
printed materials that are distributed in connection with events or
occasions that would themselves be included in the definition of a
sponsorship event."342 While the ABA Comment did not call on
the Service to change the treatment of advertising in periodicals,
it skillfully raised the issue by identifying the distinction between
its position on advertising in event programs and in periodicals.
343
339. Id.
340. These are closely related issues because a periodical is defined in Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(a) as "regularly scheduled and printed material that is not
related to and primarily distributed in connection with a specific sponsored event."
341. 1993 ABA Comment (93 TNT 144-19).
342. Id.
343. In a statement that could serve as a model of identiiying a future issue
while avoiding overreaching, the ABA Comment stated after urging that print
displays in event programs be treated as acknowledgements under the proposed
regulations. This, of course, in turn creates a distinction between ads in a program or
catalog that is related to a sponsored event and ads in a regular exempt organization
periodical Although the ads could in some cases be identical as to size, design and
content, the periodical ads, without the benefit of the corporate sponsorship rules, will
be treated under general UBIT rules as giving rise to unrelated business income.
Distinctions of some kind are unavoidable when regulations carve out a class of
arrangements or transactions and apply to such arrangements a rule of
administrative simplicity designed to avoid complications in the law that would
otherwise be applicable. If the corporate sponsorship rules are to be applied to a
limited class of arrangements defined by the regulations, there will inevitably be
points around the margins of that defined class where seemingly similar situations
are treated in dissimilar ways. Assuming that such a result is unavoidable, it seems
better to draw the line between periodicals (subject to general UBIT rules) and
materials published in connection with sponsored occasions (subject to the corporate
sponsorship rules), rather than to let the distinction fall between printed
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Certain other organizations expressed concern about the
example that seemed to suggest that revenue from the sale of logo
items is unrelated business income ."' Public broadcasters, while
expressing satisfaction at the Service reliance on FCC positions,
called for the Service to make such reliance permanent by adding
to the final regulations a provision representing that it would
defer on an ongoing basis to FCC positions. 45
Several organizations raised the fundamental question of the
scope of the proposed regulations. Is there a distinction between a
corporate sponsorship payment and a charitable contribution by a
corporate contributor? If corporate sponsorship applies to only a
subset of corporate contributions, then the distinction will neces-
sarily be somewhat arbitrary. This difficult issue was addressed
most directly and insightfully by the ABA, which reached no con-
sensus on this issue, in its testimony at the 1993 Hearings.346 The
ABA testimony noted that the most difficult issue involved corpo-
rate support for a continuing program. The lawyer presenting the
ABA testimony stated that her own solution was to treat these
payments as corporate sponsorship payments but to treat corpo-
rate contributions for facilities, such as a university building, as
subject to the less liberal return benefit test and not the more lib-
acknowledgments and acknowledgments in other forms where both are made in
connection with a sponsored event. Id. This comment skillfully treats the proposed
regulations as an accepted baseline and then treats current law as the source of an
indefensible distinction that violates norms of horizontal equity. Id.
344. Comment of the Football Bowl Association (93 TNT 133-34). The 1993 ABA
Comment called for clarification that all current exceptions to the unrelated business
income tax apply in the corporate sponsorship context (93 TNT 144-19).
345. The Comment of National Public Radio and America's Public Television
Stations (93 TNT 138-26) called upon the Service to replace Example 4 of the
proposed regulations, which referred to a sponsor announcement on a public
broadcasting station with "an announcement that has been found objectionable by the
FCC in one of its public orders or opinions." The Comment made it clear such
deference to the FCC was not a matter of resolving a particular issue but a matter of
ensuring on a continuing basis that tax law conformed to broadcast regulation.
Stating that "it is critical that the IRS rules be applied to public broadcasters in a
manner that is consistent with the FCC underwriting credit rules," the Comment
urged
To promote such consistency, we recommend that an individual in the
National Office be designated to serve as a resource within the IRS on
FCC rules; that field agents be advised to consult with such individual
concerning the application of the FCC rules to pubic broadcasters; that
such individual be authorized to coordinate with the FCC as necessary on
questions of interpretation; and that the IRS defer to FCC interpretations
of the application of these rules to public broadcasters.
Id.
346. Transcript of 1993 Hearings (testimony presented by Julie Noel Gilbert).
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eral corporate sponsorship rules of the proposed regulations. If
the proposed regulations are ever promulgated in final form, this
definitional issue remains to be addressed, whether in regula-
tions, audits, or litigation. The uncertainty over the scope of the
proposed regulations is one of the consequences of the absence of a
statutory basis for an exception for corporate sponsorship
arrangements.
These comments seeking modifications of specific provisions
in the proposed regulations appeared alongside subtle but poten-
tially important arguments seeking to use the proposed regula-
tions as the basis for more fundamental changes in the general
principles of the unrelated business income tax. For example, the
ABA Comment called upon the Service to state that a corporate
sponsorship payment is not income from a trade or business and
also called for clarification of the regularly carried on require-
ment.34 7 In effect, these very sophisticated comments treated the
proposed regulations as a statement of the Service's current posi-
tion on the unrelated business income tax rather than as an
exception to these principles.348
347. 1993 ABA Comment (available electronically at 93 TNT 144-19) urged the
Service to devise a regularly carried on requirement that would encompass a liberal
position on corporate sponsorship and reminded the Service of it risks of additional
litigation, stating
Finally, as to the "regularly carried on" requirement, a special
interpretation of the requirement applicable only in the area of corporate
sponsorship does not appear to be necessary. In this respect, it would
seem particularly desirable to develop principles of interpretation
through a process other than litigation. There would be considerable
advantage, therefore, to addressing this issue through a separate rule-
making process, with an opportunity for public comment.
348. The lobbying effort by the leading national organizations is an artful
example of modern information-based lobbying linked with the participatory
legitimacy of more broad-based coalitions including grassroots organizations. See
KaviN HuLA, ROUNDING UP THE USUAL SusPEcTs: FORGING INTEREST GROUP
COALITIONS IN WASMINGTON, in INTEREST GROUP PoLITIcs (Allan J. Cigler and Burdett
A- Loomis eds., 4th ed. 1995); JOHN P. HEINz, ST AL. Tim HoLLow CORE: PRrVATE
INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICY MAKING (1993). The currency of this information-
based lobbying is expertise, especially that expertise in drafting and interpreting
statutes and regulations particular to lawyers. However, expertise does not mean
neutrality. Indeed, most lawyers with the requisite expertise have acquired such
expertise representing clients with particular and legitimate interests in the outcome
of issue controversies such as corporate sponsorship. Such persons' interests are clear
when they identify their clients but may not be clear when the same persons act
through a professional association. The problem is not overlapping roles, which
would invite a relatively straightforward solution, but instead the broader and more
complex issue of how lawyers acquire and use their expertise and the absence of any
alternative to the dual role of lawyers. This issue is not confined to expertise-based
lobbying on tax issues. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L.
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Despite the subtlety of this approach, it appears to have fallen
short of achieving either it immediate aim of protecting corporate
sponsorship payments from taxation or its broader aim of chang-
ing certain fundamental principles of the unrelated business
income tax. It is uncertain whether the proposed regulations will
be promulgated in final form. This situation arises from two
related problems with the proposed regulations-they have no
basis in the current statute and they create significant issues of
statutory dissonance. Both of these problems arise from attempt-
ing to create an exception to a statute through regulations. Each
of these problems is discussed below.
VIII. REGULATORY EXCEPrIONs AND STATUTORY DISSONANCE
The lack of a statutory basis for the proposed regulations
becomes apparent from the placement of the regulations under
Section 513. This section provides both the general definition of
unrelated business income and delineates the statutory excep-
tions to it. The proposed regulations attempt the ultimately self-
defeating task of defining an exception on the basis of the general
principles. As discussed above, none of the specific narrowly-tai-
lored exceptions applies to corporate sponsorship arrange-
ments.3 49 Consequently, none of these exceptions can be used as
the statutory basis for the corporate sponsorship exception. This
leaves the Service in the position of attempting to fashion an
exception for corporate sponsorship from the general statutory
principles defining unrelated business income. However, as the
foregoing analysis suggests, these general principles would treat
corporate sponsorship as an unrelated business income transac-
tion, not as a charitable contribution transaction or an exempt
function transaction. Attempting to avoid this result in the case of
corporate sponsorship has lead to the second problem with the
proposed regulations, statutory dissonance.
REv. 1783 (1994)(Symposium on the Revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code). For more general discussions of lawyer's roles in representing clients and
shaping the law in particular substantive areas through participation in bar
associations or other law reform efforts, see David Luban, The Nobless Oblige
Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 717 (1988)(Brandeis and
"progressive professionalism"); Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public
Calling, 49 Md. L. Rev. 255 (1990)(noting example of tax lawyers); Robert W. Gordon,
The Independence of Lawyers, 68 Boston U. L. Rev. 1 (1988)(tension between norms of
professional culture and "capture7 of law reform fora by special interests within the
bar).
349. See supra at Part V.B.
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Statutory dissonance is used here to describe conflict in the
results and rationales of provisions of one statute.35 ° It has been
suggested here that dissonance in results may have more limited
implications than does dissonance in rationales. Not all special
provisions create dissonance even in result. Some special rules
set forth the implications of the general provisions for particular
fact patterns and clarify their treatment under the general princi-
ples. The statutory modifications of Section 512(b) are special
rules of this type. The exceptions of Section 513 are clearer cases
of statutory dissonance. Yet, these are very narrowly-drafted
exceptions that simply provide for results that could not be
reached under the general principles of the statute but which do
not depend on redefining those principles. Congress has the
authority to enact such exceptions that provide for nonconforming
results without providing a rationale for the exception based on
the general principles of the statute. Statutory dissonance with
respect to narrowly-defined results does not necessarily under-
mine the general statutory structure and may well serve to pre-
serve it by obviating the necessity of modifying the general
structure and fundamental principles of the statute.
Statutory dissonance arising through regulations interpreting
general principles of a statute threaten precisely this broader
redefinition of the statute. This is the problem presented by the
proposed regulations on corporate sponsorship, which raise issues
of statutory dissonance with respect to the definition of a trade or
business and the regularly carried on requirement as well as with
respect to their application to advertising in exempt organization
journals and the quid pro quo provisions under Section 170.
Treating corporate sponsorship arrangements as not a trade
or business would not only undermine the profit motive test but
also raise the difficult question of a corporate sponsorship
arrangement is in terms of the activities performed by the exempt
organization.3 51 The transactional model of exempt organization
operations suggests that an exempt organization engages in two
types of activities-exempt functions consistent with its exempt
purposes or trade or business activities. The model further sug-
gests that exempt function activities are the activities pursued by
the exempt organization in the charitable contribution transaction
and the exempt function transaction, while in the unrelated busi-
350. Statutory coordination here refers to efforts to reconcile the implications of
two or more statutes as they apply to a particular legal issue.
351. The trade or business test of current law is discussed supra at Part V(A)(1).
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ness transaction the exempt organization engages in trade or
business activities. The corporate sponsorship proposed regula-
tions do not fit into this model to the extent that they treat a trade
or business activity as part of some transaction other than an
unrelated business transaction. They diverge from the statutory
concept of a trade or business to the extent that they attempt to
define corporate sponsorship activities as distinct from trade or
business activities.
The statutory dissonance with the regularly carried on con-
cept is even clearer.3 52 The proposed regulations so blur the
already problematic concept of what activities are regularly car-
ried on that the Service would be pressed to withdraw its nonac-
quiescence to the NCAA decision.353 The consequence of this
change would be a substantial limitation on the application of the
unrelated business income tax.
The result reached in the proposed regulations contrasts
starkly with the Service's treatment of print advertising in
exempt organization journals.3 54 The proposed regulations simply
state that they do not apply to this case. However, the divergent
results highlight the statutory dissonance introduced by the cor-
porate sponsorship regulations. If these regulations are based on
the general principles of the statute which also apply to print
advertising, on what grounds can the Service maintain its position
with respect to print advertising? If a corporate sponsor's name
and logo on a football field or basketball court in a nationally tele-
vised game constitutes a mere acknowledgement, why should a
corporate sponsor's name and logo on the page of an organization's
journal constitute advertising? Regulations must find a basis for
such a distinction in the statute under which they are promul-
gated, and the unrelated business income tax provisions of the
Code provide no statutory basis for such a distinction.
The statutory dissonance between the proposed regulations
and the statutory provisions on quid pro quo contributions are
equally stark. 55 Organizations that must document for contribu-
tors the value of a tote bag would be free of any such responsibility
with respect to corporate sponsorship payments under the pro-
posed regulations. In effect, a tote bag would be treated as a sub-
stantial benefit while exposure for a corporation's name and logo
352. The regularly carried on test of current law is discussed supra at Part
V(A)(2).
353. See supra at text accompanying notes 136-37.
354. See supra at Part V(AX4).
355. See supra at Part I1(C).
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to a stadium crowd and a national television audience would not
be a substantial benefit.
The magnitude of the incongruence produced by the statutory
dissonance introduced by the proposed regulations has resulted in
reconsideration of the proposed regulations themselves. The prob-
lem is not that private groups lobbied the Service or that some
groups may have had access outside the formal process of the pub-
lic hearing. Administrative agency lobbying is a long-established
method of representing clients' legitimate interests by shaping
applicable regulations and agency contacts with the public are not
limited in the same way as contacts between bench and bar in a
judicial proceeding.3 56 The problem posed by the proposed regula-
tions arises not from the process by which they were produced but
the result they reached and the attempt to define a statutory
exception in regulations. The choice is between a different result
through regulations or a narrowly-focused statutory exception.
In the context of the unrelated business income tax, Congress
has enacted several special exceptions to ensure results that
would not otherwise be possible by applying the general principles
of the statute. 57 This is the role of Congress, subject to review
ultimately by the Supreme Court. While every exception raises
important questions of fairness, the appropriate debate is over the
wisdom of the particular exception, not over Congress' right to
enact it.
A special rule dealing with the college bowl games would
present anomalies. For example, a corporate sponsor whose name
and logo were displayed sixty times during a heavily watched bowl
game would be treated as having received nothing of value while
the recipient of a tote bag in exchange for a contribution to public
broadcasting would be able to deduct only the amount of the con-
tribution in excess of the value of the tote bag. The anomaly
become less troubling when these two examples are viewed tran-
sactionally. The issue is not the deduction by the contributor.
Here, the corporation will be able to deduct the corporate sponsor-
ship payment under either Section 162(a) as an ordinary or neces-
sary business expense or under Section 170 as a charitable
contribution, while the corporate or individual contributor to pub-
lic broadcasting will have only the Section 170 claim. The issue is
356. This is not to suggest that questions of administrative representation do
not raise significant issues of professional responsibility and of policy-making in the
administrative state but rather to suggest that these questions do not define the core
of the debate over corporate sponsorship.
357. See supra at Part V(B).
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the tax treatment of the payment in the hands of the organization.
This treatment depends on whether the organization provided a
quid pro quo. There is little reasonable debate over whether the
name and logo displays featured at the bowl games are valuable or
whether they are exchanged for the corporate sponsorship pay-
ment. Similarly, there can be little debate over whether the tote
bag is an item of value received in exchange for the contribution,
also a quid pro quo. Why, then, is public broadcasting not taxable
under current law on the amount of the contribution for which the
contributor may not claim a charitable contribution deduction?
The answer is found in the statutory exception for income earned
from events run by volunteers358 and the exception for income
from the sale of contributed property.359 Although this will be a
facts and circumstances determination in each particular case,
Congress has created an exception that protects recipient organi-
zations from the tax consequences of a quid pro quo analysis. Pri-
vate school auctions and other fundraisers also benefit from these
exceptions.
In this light, enacting another special rule would be neither
unprecedented nor unprincipled. This tension between general
rules and exceptions, between structure and anti-structure is a
fundamental element in all legal systems and social structures.
Treating corporate sponsorship as an exception, as an element of
anti-structure would preserve the structure of the unrelated busi-
ness income tax more effectively than the tortuous and ultimately
unworkable efforts to accommodate corporate sponsorship within
the general rules.
Yet, this legislative resolution of the corporate sponsorship
issue would raise again and with particular force the question of
when special exceptions have become so numerous or so funda-
mental that they erode the general statutory structure by posing
unanswerable questions of both coherence and fairness. Such
larger questions with respect to the unrelated business income tax
and the exemption itself are ripe for consideration in terms of the
actual operations of contemporary organizations.
358. I.R.C. § 513(a)(1). See supra at text accompanying notes 210-12.
359. I.R.C. § 513(a)(3). See supra at text accompanying notes 213-14.
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